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ARTICLE
A STREAM OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS: THE
CURRENT OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE
FROM SWIFT TO JONES & LAUGHLIN
BARRY CUSHMAN*
In this article on constitutional development and the New Deal Court Professor
Cushman argues that the conventional story of the Court's radical reversing of its
jurisprudence in the face of the Court-packing plan is misconceived. The article
instead seeks to demonstrate that Jones & Laughlin, one of the cases comprising
the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 was conceptually, stylistically, and doctri-
nally congruent with the Court's contemporary jurisprudence. The paradigm
shift in commerce clause jurisprudence, Professor Cushman contends, came not
in 1937, but in 1941 and 1942, after Roosevelt had had an opportunity to refash-
ion the Court with a new generation of legal thinkers.
M ORE than a generation of constitutional historians have viewed the
events of 1937 as a political drama in which a recalcitrant judiciary
reluctantly knuckled under to the political muscle of Franklin Roosevelt.
Together with the decisions in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish' and the So-
cial Security cases,2 the opinions in the Wagner Act cases' have been cast
as part of the "Constitutional Revolution" of 1937. Indeed, the claim
that the Wagner Act cases marked a reversal of (or a substantial depar-
ture from) the Court's earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been
accepted with near-unanimity by the historical community.4 The con-
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law; B.A. 1982, Am-
herst College; M.A., J.D. 1986, University of Virginia. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the valuable criticisms of Patrice Cushman, Chris Eisgruber, Roger Goldman, John
Griesbach, Alan Howard, Michael Klarman, Charles McCurdy, Eben Moglen, William
Nelson, John Phillip Reid, G. Edward White, Doug Williams, and the members of the
Legal History Colloquium at the New York University School of Law. Thanks are also
due to William E. Jackson and Mary Jackson Craighill for permission to quote from the
Robert Jackson papers.
1. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
2. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
3. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49
(1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Washington, Virginia
& Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
4. See Joseph Alsop & Turner Catledge, The 168 Days 142-47 (1938); Richard C.
Cortner, The Jones & Laughlin Case 159, 174 (1970) [hereinafter The Jones & Laughlin
Case]; Richard C. Cortner, The Wagner Act Cases 184-94 (1964) [hereinafter The Wag-
ner Act Cases]; Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 53, 72 (1941) [herein-
after Constitutional Revolution, Ltd.]; Edward S. Corwin, Court Over Constitution 156
& n. 60 (1938) [hereinafter Court Over Constitution]; Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle
for Judicial Supremacy 191-92, 218, 235 (1941); Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone:
Pillar of the Law 455, 458 (1956); Alpheus T. Mason & William M. Beaney, The
Supreme Court in a Free Society 182-84 (1959); Robert G. McCloskey, The American
Supreme Court 176-77 (1960); Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times, 1918-
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ventional view is that the Court beat a "strategic retreat" 5 from its earlier
jurisprudence: chastened by Roosevelt's landslide victory in the 1936
election, and coerced by his subsequent plan to reform the federal judici-
ary, the Court bowed to the inevitability of the New Deal.6
I have expressed elsewhere my reasons for doubting that either the
Court-packing plan or the 1936 election satisfactorily explains the
Court's disposition of cases in the spring of 1937.7 In this article I am
concerned with the effect that this conventional wisdom has had on our
understanding of the development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. I
will argue that the conceptualization of the Wagner Act cases as essen-
tially political responses to political pressure has impoverished our un-
derstanding of Commerce Clause doctrine in two ways: first, the
conventional learning ignores important conceptual and doctrinal conti-
nuities displayed in Chief Justice Hughes' Wagner Act opinions; and sec-
ond, the conventional wisdom understates the extent to which cases
decided by the Roosevelt Court in the early 1940s were truly
revolutionary.
This conventional wisdom is grounded in the potent combination of
legal realism and Progressive historiography, exemplified by the work of
Edward Corwin, which for decades served as the dominant paradigm for
understanding the constitutional history of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. In Corwin's view, dual federalism and substantive
due process were merely convenient weapons in the arsenal of a reaction-
ary Court devoted to maintaining the hegemony of corporate and finan-
cial elites at the expense of ordinary citizens.' More recently, scholars
have begun to challenge this view, persuasively contending that the doc-
trines of economic substantive due process were not simply spun out of
1969, at 153-54 (1972) [hereinafter Crisis Times]; Fred Rodell, Nine Men: A Political
History of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1955, at 249-50 (1955); Bernard Schwartz,
The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect 16, 35 (1957); William F.
Swindler, Court and Constitution in the Twentieth Century: The New Legality 1932-
1968, at 99-100, 137 (1970); Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitu-
tional Law 179 (1967); William Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Supreme Court
'Packing' Plan, in Essays on the New Deal 69, 94 (Harold M. Hollingsworth & William
F. Holmes eds., 1969).
5. See The Wagner Act Cases, supra note 4, at 188; McCloskey, supra note 4, at 224;
Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court: A Case Study in the American Political
Process 65 (1962); Wright, supra note 4, at 222.
6. See Alsop & Catledge, supra note 4, at 141; Court Over Constitution, supra note
4, at 127; Crisis Times, supra note 4, at 115; Swindler, supra note 4, at 81; Wright, supra
note 4, at 205.
7. See Barry Cushman, Unmaking the Myth of the New Deal Court: The 'Switch-
in-Time' Reconsidered (currently unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
8. For a discussion of the array of ideas comprehended by the term "dual federal-
ism", see Edward S. Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court 11-12 (1934) [hereinaf-
ter Twilight of the Supreme Court]; Edward S. Corwin, The Commerce Power Versus
States Rights: "Back to the Constitution" 115-72 (1936) [hereinafter Commerce Power].
On the distinction between procedural and substantive due process, see John E. Nowak et
al., Constitutional Law 416-18 (2d ed. 1983).
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thin air in order to protect the position of the robber barons of the Gilded
Age. Substantive due process doctrines have instead come to be under-
stood as the juristic embodiments of such antebellum ideological commit-
ments as northern "free labor ideology" and the Jacksonian's egalitarian
opposition to "class legislation," and we now recognize that they were
frequently deployed to the detriment of business interests.' Similarly, the
roots of dual federalism may be seen in the ideological commitment to
the preservation of liberty through the diffusion of power-a commit-
ment that certainly antedated the Gilded Age, and can hardly be said to
have been forged for the purpose of perpetuating elite hegemony."o In
short, dual federalism and substantive due process were two conceptual
manifestations of a well-established, integrated vision of civic liberty in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century United States. Recent
scholarship counsels us not to allow the fact that wealthy and powerful
interests often manipulated these concepts to their advantage to cheapen
our understanding."
This integrated vision of civic liberty was set forth trenchantly in a
speech given by Chief Justice Melville Fuller before a joint session of
Congress on the occasion of the centennial of George Washington's inau-
guration as President. Contemplating the future of the republic Wash-
ington had helped to create, Fuller spoke of two great dangers looming
on the horizon.
One was that "the drift toward the exertion of the national will" might
ultimately result in "consolidation," which in turn would impair the
"vital importance" of the states and undermine self-government by ex-
tending the sphere of legislative authority to such a degree that the
people no longer controlled it. The other was "the drift... towards
increased interference by the State in the attempt to alleviate inequality
of conditions." Fuller admitted that "[s]o long as that interference is
. . protective only," it was not only legitimate but necessary. "But,"
he added, "the rights to life, to use one's faculties in all lawful ways,
and to acquire and enjoy property, are morally fundamental rights an-
tecedent to constitutions, which do not create, but secure and protect
them." 12
9. See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law & Hist. Rev. 293, 293-331
(1985); William Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the
Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 767, 767-817 (1985); Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of
'Liberty of Contract' Reconsidered. Major Premises in the Law of Employment. 1867-
1937, in Yearbook of the Supreme Court Historical Society 20, 20-33 (1984).
10. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 198-229
(1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 344-89
(1969); Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical
and Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. Tol. L. Rev. 619, 635, 676 (1978).
11. See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic Order,
1789-1910, 10 Law & Soc'y Rev. 57 (1975) (discussing relationship between American
federalism and the American economic order).
12. Charles W. McCurdy, Fuller, Melville WV (1833-1910). in 2 Encyclopedia of the
American Constitution 813, 813-14 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986) (quoting Melville
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
These concerns of course were to be manifested in the Fuller Court's
Commerce Clause and due process jurisprudence. Just as the ideological
commitments underlying these two areas of jurisprudence were part of
an integrated vision of civic liberty for Fuller and many of his contempo-
raries, so during Fuller's tenure would the juridical manifestations of
these commitments become integrated at the level of doctrine. As I shall
show here and elsewhere, 13 due process concepts informed Commerce
Clause concepts, and conversely. As a result, the two areas of doctrine
became developmentally interdependent: changes in due process doc-
trine implied modifications of Commerce Clause doctrine; developments
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence foretold transformations of due pro-
cess doctrine.
With this understanding, we can begin to trace the ways in which cer-
tain constitutional conceptions evolved to the point that they could work
a "constitutional revolution." We can see how these conceptions were
forged and molded in the hands of the Justices; how they were grasped,
manipulated and deployed by legislators framing statutes and lawyers
selecting test cases and crafting legal arguments; how these legal argu-
ments resonated with the doctrinal categories comprising the constitu-
tional culture and consciousness of the New Deal Justices; and how these
categories quickly became irrelevant to the new generation of men ap-
pointed to the Court by Franklin Roosevelt. To achieve this understand-
ing, our story must begin not with the year of Franklin Roosevelt's
election as President, but rather with the period of his youth.
PROLOGUE: LAISSEZ-FAIRE FORMALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE CURRENT OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE
In 1869, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase used the opportunity presented
by Texas v. White 14 to adumbrate the contours of the postbellum consti-
tutional order. "[T]he perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union,"
Chase declared, "by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual
existence, or of the right of self-government by the States."I 5 Each of the
several state governments were, like the federal government, "'endowed
with all of the functions essential to separate and independent exist-
ence.' "16 "[T]he preservation of the States," Chase concluded, "and the
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and
care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the mainte-
nance of the National [G]overnment. The Constitution, in all its provi-
W. Fuller, Address in Commemoration of the Inauguration of George Washington as
First President of the United States, Delivered Before the Two Houses of Congress (Dec.
11, 1889)).
13. See Barry Cushman, The Trail of the Yellow Dog: Liberty of Contract and Col-
lective Bargaining from Adair to the Wagner Act Cases, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming
1992).
14. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
15. Id. at 725.
16. Id. (quoting County of Lane v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
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sions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States.""7 The aphoristic quality of Chase's dictum disposed it to repeti-
tion; and indeed, "'an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States' quickly supplanted E pluribus unum as the motto of choice for
conveying the essence of American federalism.""8 Moreover, because ju-
dicial review had been securely established by 1869, to say that the main-
tenance of such a Union was "within the design and care of the
Constitution" was to appoint the federal judiciary as its conservator. 19
Espousing the constitutional cosmology expounded by Chase in Texas
v. White, Supreme Court Justices of the late nineteenth century elabo-
rated the theory of constitutional government that Edward Corwin
dubbed "dual federalism." Because the federal government was one of
enumerated powers, argued exponents of dual federalism, and because
the Tenth Amendment reserved all unenumerated powers to the states,
state and federal authorities were absolutely sovereign within their re-
spective spheres of power. These respective spheres of state and federal
authority were completely separate and distinct: there was no area in
which state and federal authority overlapped. If an entity or activity was
subject to federal regulation, it was immune to state regulation, and con-
versely. The boundaries and diameters of these spheres of federal and
state authority were, moreover, immutable and timeless-the necessary
implications of our constitutional system. 20
In practice, the theory of dual federalism yielded a narrow construc-
tion of the scope of the federal government's power to regulate com-
merce. Two antitrust prosecutions from the 1890s serve to illustrate this
proposition. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co.," the American Sugar
Refining Company had, through acquisition of four Pennsylvania refin-
ing companies, obtained control of over ninety-eight percent of the sugar
refining capacity of the United States. The federal government brought
an action under the Sherman Antitrust Act, seeking to void the transac-
tions by which the Pennsylvania refineries had been acquired. In an
opinion teeming with the language of dual federalism, the Supreme Court
rejected the government's prayer.' "That which belongs to commerce is
within the jurisdiction of the United States," wrote Chief Justice Fuller,
"but that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of
the police power of the State."2 The refinement of sugar was held to be
17. Id
18. Charles W. McCurdy, Federalism and the Judicial Mind in a Conservative Age:
Stephen Field, in Power Divided: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Federalism 33
(Harry N. Scheiber & Marcus M. Feeley eds., 1989) [hereinafter Federalism and the Judi-
cial Mind] (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868)).
19. Id
20. See Court Over Constitution, supra note 4, at 131; Commerce Power, supra note
8, at 115-72; Twilight of the Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 11-12; Federalism and the
Judicial Mind, supra note 18, at 32-35.
21. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
22. See id at 17.
23. Id at 12.
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a subject within the jurisdiction of the states.24 "Commerce succeeds to
manufacture," the Court held, "and is not a part of it."25 "It is vital,"
explained Fuller,
that the independence of the commercial power and of the police
power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes per-
plexing, should always be recognized and observed, for while the one
furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the...
autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of government.
26
Fuller found support for the Court's position in Justice Lamar's opinion
in Kidd v. Pearson:27
Manufacture is transformation-the fashioning of raw materials into a
change of form for use. The functions of commerce are different.... If
it be held that the term [commerce] includes the regulation of all such
manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transac-
tions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include all
productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result
would be that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the
States, with the power to regulate, not only manufactures, but also
agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining-in
short, every branch of human industry.28
Combinations to control domestic enterprise in manufacturing, the
Court held, affected interstate commerce only indirectly. To be subject to
the federal commerce power, the impact of an activity was required to be
direct.29
Hopkins v. United Statesa" further illustrates the restrictions placed
upon the commerce power by dual federalism. Hopkins involved a prose-
cution of members of the Kansas City Livestock Exchange under the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The Exchange was an association of commis-
sion merchants doing business at the Kansas City Stock Yards. That
association had adopted certain governing rules which, the Justice De-
partment contended, constituted agreements in restraint of trade. The
objectionable rules prohibited members from buying livestock from any
Kansas City commission merchant who was not a member of the Ex-
change, and fixed the commissions for the sale of livestock. Justice Ru-
fus W. Peckham held that the transactions engaged in by the commission
merchants were purely local in nature and therefore did not fall within
the scope of the Sherman Act.3
1
The sale or purchase of live stock as commission merchants at Kansas
City is the business done, and its character is not altered because the
24. See id. at 17.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 13.
27. 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
28. E.G. Knight, 156 U.S. at 14 (quoting Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20-21).
29. See id. at 16-17.
30. 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
31. See id. at 588.
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larger proportion of the purchases and sales may be of live stock sent
into the State from other States or from the Territories. Where the
stock came from or where it may ultimately go after a sale or purchase,
procured through the services of one of the defendants at the Kansas
City stock yards, is not the substantial factor in the case. The charac-
ter of the business of defendants must, in this case, be determined by
the facts occurring at that city . .. [We regard the [commission
merchant's] services as collateral to such [interstate] commerce and in
the nature of a local aid or facility provided for the cattle owner to-
wards the accomplishment of his purpose to sell them; and an agree-
ment among those who render the services relating to the terms upon
which they will render them is not a contract in restraint of interstate
trade or commerce. 3
2
Existing alongside of dual federalism as a restraint on governmental
regulatory power was the distinction between public and private enter-
prise found in the Court's due process jurisprudence. At common law,
the State was clothed with a general police power to regulate private
business for the protection of public health, safety, and morals. Govern-
mental regulation of prices charged for goods and services, however, was
limited to "businesses affected with a public interest."33
The doctrine of a business affected with a public interest was first in-
troduced into American constitutional law in Munn v. Illinois,' a case
involving the validity of an Illinois statute regulating rates for grain ele-
vators. Upholding the Illinois regulation against charges that it deprived
the petitioner of his property without due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Waite held:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence, and affect a community at
large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the
public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the com-
mon good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.35
Holding that the grain elevator owned by Munn was a business affected
with a public interest, and therefore subject to reasonable regulation for
the public good, Waite described the elevator as standing "in the very
'gateway of commerce,' [taking] toll from all who pass. ' 36 This language
might seem more appropriate to the discussion of an issue concerning the
commerce power than to discussion of a due process issue. Indeed, the
32. Id.
33. On the origins of the "public interest" concept and its adoption in Munn V. Illi-
nois, see Charles Fairman, The So-Called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley,
5 Stan. L. Rev. 587, 588 (1953); Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39
Yale L.L 1089, 1092-99 (1930); Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected
with a Public Interest, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 759, 768-69 (1930).
34. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
35. Id, at 126.
36. Id, at 132.
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common law doctrine from which Waite was borrowing had been devel-
oped in part to prevent exorbitant charges for necessary services from
impeding the flow of commercial traffic.
The image of a gateway of commerce was to be echoed in later Com-
merce Clause discourse. The Court, while retaining the public interest
doctrine as a due process restraint on state and federal regulatory author-
ity, would at the same time seek to reunite the doctrine with its early
commercial traffic rationale by transplanting it to the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Waite's invocation of commerce language in dis-
cussing a due process issue, then, foreshadowed the profound conceptual
interrelation that later Justices were to forge between those two areas of
doctrine.37
Justice Field, joined by Justice Strong, filed a dissent which stands as a
landmark in the history of laissez-faire formalism. Envisioning an on-
slaught of business regulation and an end to property rights as he knew
them, Field offered a generally applicable, bright-line distinction between
public and private enterprise:
It is only where some right or privilege is conferred by the government
or municipality upon the owner, which he can use in connection with
his property, or by means of which the use of his property is rendered
more valuable to him, or he thereby enjoys an advantage over others,
that the compensation to be received by him becomes a legitimate mat-
37. See infra notes 49-63, 79-86 and accompanying text. Waite's opinion was mod-
elled on a memorandum written by fellow Justice Joseph Bradley, in which Bradley de-
fended the Illinois regulations on the basis of the common-law notion of a business
affected with a public interest innovated by Lord Matthew Hale in his works De Jure
Maris and De Portibus Marls. For a discussion of Hale's works and their publication, see
Francis Hargrave, A Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of England from Manu-
scripts (1787). In those writings, Hale supported public regulation of ferries, wharves,
wharf cranes and port warehouses on the ground that they were so peculiarly situated in
the commercial market that they might exact "arbitrary and excessive duties." Fairman,
supra note 33, at 656, 670-71 (quoting Hale, De Portibus Maris, pt. II, ch. VI, in Har-
grave, supra, at 77, and quoting Hale, De Jure Mars, pt. I, cl. II, in Hargrave, supra, at
6). The use of each of these instrumentalities was a necessary incident of the movement
of people or goods in the furtherance of commercial intercourse, and each of them was
situated at a choke point in that movement. The exaction of such "arbitrary and exces-
sive duties" might therefore impede the ordinary course of commercial traffic. As
Charles Fairman noted, these were for Hale "situations where the private interest of the
owner is subordinated to the general interest in the flow of commerce." Fairman, supra
note 33, at 655 (emphasis added). The gateway notion in which due process and Com-
merce Clause doctrine were to converge was therefore present in the thought of the inno-
vator of the public interest doctrine. Though the doctrine was imported into our
constitutional law through the Due Process Clause, it was clearly designed in part to
remove impediments to the flow of commercial traffic. It is therefore not surprising that
later Justices would welcome the concept into their Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See
infra notes 49-63, 79-86 and accompanying text. In fact, Waite conceded that grain ele-
vators might have been so closely connected to interstate commerce as to be subject to
congressional regulation. In the absence of such congressional action, however, he and
his brethren were not prepared to deny to the State the power to regulate what was quite
naturally at the time considered a "domestic concern." Munn, 94 U.S. at 135. See Fair-
man, supra note 33, at 647.
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ter of regulation. Submission to the regulation of compensation in
such cases is an implied condition of the grant, and the State, in exer-
cising its power of prescribing the compensation, only determines the
conditions upon which its concession shall be enjoyed. 38
Despite the concerns of Justice Field, the class of businesses that the
Court recognized as being affected with a public interest remained small
for more than fifty years after Munn. In 1923, Chief Justice Taft identi-
fied three general classes of businesses affected with a public interest:
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant
of privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirma-
tive duty of rendering a public service demanded by any member of the
public. Such are the railroads, other common carriers and public
utilities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional.... Such are those
of the keepers of inns, cabs and grist mills.
(3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may be
fairly said to have risen to be such and have become subject in conse-
quence to some government regulation. They have come to hold such
a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed upon them.
In the language of the cases, the owner by devoting his business to the
public use, in effect grants the public an interest in that use and sub-
jects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest although
the property continues to belong to its private owner and to be entitled
to protection accordingly.3 9
The select nature of membership in this third class of businesses af-
fected with a public interest is illustrated by the fact that, Munn in-
cluded, the Court cited only eight Supreme Court cases over a forty-six
year period in which a statute had been upheld as a valid regulation of a
business affected with a public interest." Moreover, the Court's opinion
evinced an intent to keep Taft's third class of businesses affected with a
public interest narrow:
It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the Constitution, that
the business of the butcher, or the baker, the tailor, the wood chopper,
the mining operator or the miner was clothed with such a public inter-
est that the price of his product or his wages could be fixed by state
regulation.... [N]owadays one does not devote one's property or busi-
ness to the public use or clothe it with a public interest merely because
one makes commodities for, and sells to, the public in the common
callings of which those above mentioned are instances.41
Indeed, perhaps fearing the parade of horribles described by Field in his
Munn dissent,4 2 Taft sought to define the contours of the third class of
38. Munn, 94 U.S. at 146-47.
39. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923) (cita-
tions omitted).
40. See id at 535-36.
41. IA at 537.
42. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 136, 140-154 (1877).
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businesses affected with a public interest: "In nearly all the businesses
included under the third head above, the thing which gave the public
interest was the indispensable nature of the service and the exorbitant
charges and arbitrary control to which the public might be subjected with-
out regulation. "43
The concept of a business affected with a public interest became incor-
porated into Commerce Clause doctrine in an extremely important way
in 1905. Swift & Co. v. United States' involved, in the words of Justice
Holmes, a prosecution under the Sherman Act charging:
[A] combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh meat
throughout the United States not to bid against each other in the live
stock markets of the different States, to bid up prices for a few days in
order to induce the cattle men to send their stock to the stock yards, to
fix prices at which they will sell, and to that end to restrict shipments
of meat when necessary, to establish a uniform rule of credit to dealers
and to keep a black list, to make uniform and improper charges for
cartage, and finally, to get less than lawful rates from the railroads to
the exclusion of competitors.45
Holding the activities of the packers to be within the reach of the federal
commerce power and thereby opening the first chink in the armor of dual
federalism, Justice Holmes wrote:
[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a
practical one, drawn from the course of business. When cattle are sent
for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will
end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do
so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock
yards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, the cur-
rent thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, and the
purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.46
This language, of course, easily could have been deployed to sustain
the prosecution in United States v. Hopkins; indeed, District Judge Cas-
sius Foster had coined the term "stream of commerce" in upholding the
government's prosecution of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange.47
When the current of commerce theory had been offered to the Supreme
Court on appeal in 1898, however, the Justices had unanimously rejected
it.48 In order to persuade those of his brethren who had so recently es-
chewed the current of commerce theory, Holmes was obliged to articu-
43. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 538 (emphasis added).
44. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
45. Id. at 394.
46. Id. at 398-99.
47. See United States v. Hopkins, 82 F. 529 (C.C.D. Kan. 1897), rev'd, 171 U.S. 578
(1898).
48. See Brief for Appellee at 132, Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 590-91
(1898); see also David Gordon, Swift & Co. v. United States: The Beef Trust and the
Stream of Commerce Doctrine, 28 Am. J. Legal Hist. 244, 250-53 (1984) (analyzing the
evolution of the stream of commerce doctrine).
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late a distinction between the facts of Hopkins and those of Swift, and
mere location in a current of interstate commerce would not suffice. "All
that was decided there," Holmes wrote of Hopkins,
was that the local business of commission merchants was not com-
merce among the States, even if what the brokers were employed to sell
was an object of such commerce. The brokers were not like the de-
fendants before us, themselves the buyers and sellers. They only fur-
nished certain facilities for the sales. Therefore, there again the effects
of the combination of brokers upon the commerce was only indirect
and not within the act. Whether the case would have been different if
the combination had resulted in exorbitant charges, was left open.49
The clear implication of the highlighted language was noted by Chief
Justice Taft in Stafford v. Wallace:
[I]f the result of the combination of commission men in the Hopkins
Case had been to impose exorbitant charges on the passage of live
stock through the stockyards from one State to another, the case
would have been different.... The effect on interstate commerce in
such a case would have been direct. 50
The language employed to distinguish Hopkins by Holmes in Swift and
by Taft in Stafford is, of course, the language Taft used in Wolff Packing
to describe the third class of businesses affected with a public interest.
Holmes made two significant conceptual moves here. First, by identi-
fying the capacity to affect commerce directly with the capacity to exact
exorbitant charges, Holmes effectively conflated the direct/indirect dis-
tinction of Knight with the public/private distinction of Munn. A busi-
ness affected with a public interest had the capacity to affect commerce
directly; a purely private business did not. Second, by accepting the con-
cept of a current of commerce into the constitutional lexicon, Holmes
threatened to bring business activities previously considered purely local
within the reach of the federal commerce power.
Both of these moves were, of course, the stuff of a laissez-faire formal-
ist's5' nightmare. If every business affected with a public interest had the
capacity to affect interstate commerce directly, then every such business
would be subject to federal regulation and the police powers of the states
would be greatly curtailed. Likewise, in an economy becoming increas-
ingly integrated on a national scale, there was virtually no end to the list
of business activities that could be conceived as existing in a current of
commerce.
Holmes wrote Swift for a unanimous Court of Justices reared on for-
49. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905) (emphasis added).
50. 258 U.S. 495, 525 (1922).
51. In this article I use "laissez-faire formalist" to denote legal thinkers whose juris-
prudence embraced dual federalism and the various manifestations of economic substan-
tive due process. See generally Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence
of Government-Business Relations. Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
61 J. Am. Hist. 970 (1975) (discussing laissez-faire formalism).
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malism, and the solution he implicitly proposed to this formalist di-
lemma was simple yet ingenious: these two concepts, that of a current of
commerce and that of a business affected with a public interest, would
operate as reciprocal restraints on federal power and would, to an extent,
become conflated. An intrastate business affected with a public interest
could not be reached by the federal commerce power unless it could be
located within a current of interstate commerce, and an intrastate busi-
ness activity did not constitute part of a federally regulable current of
commerce unless it was also a business affected with a public interest. In
short, the current of commerce came to be understood as a sequence of
interstate business activities connected by intrastate business activities af-
fected with a public interest. Because the category of businesses affected
with a public interest promised to remain small and select, the current of
commerce promised to cut a narrow channel. The realities of a nation-
ally integrated economy thus could be acknowledged by the Constitution
without dismantling the categories of laissez-faire formalism or signifi-
cantly altering the balance of intergovernmental authority. It was this
essentially formalistic understanding of the current of commerce that
prevailed throughout the 1920s and, I shall argue, throughout the 1930s
as well.-
2
I. THE CURRENT OF COMMERCE, 1921-1930
A. The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 and Stafford v. Wallace
Stafford v. Wallace53 brought to the Court the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.14 The Act author-
ized the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the business of meat packers
done in interstate commerce, and forbade the packers from engaging in
any unfair, discriminatory, or deceptive practices in interstate commerce.
Title III of the Act authorized the Secretary to regulate transactions in
the stockyards, including the rates to be charged for stockyard services
and the fees to be charged by commission men making sales of stock in
interstate commerce. The constitutionality of the Act was challenged by
commission men doing business at the Union Stock Yards in Chicago.
The definition of commerce set forth in Title I betrayed the debt of the
Act's draftsmen to Holmes. That definition provided in pertinent part:
[A] transaction in respect to any article shall be considered to be in
commerce if such article is part of that current of commerce usual in
the live-stock and meat-packing industries, whereby live stock.., are
52. For the contrary, conventional view that Swift overruled Knight, see, for example,
Court Over Constitution, supra note 4, at 120; Twilight of the Supreme Court, supra note
8, at 40; Thomas R. Powell, Vagaries and Varieties of Constitutional Interpretation 59
(1956); Wright, supra note 4, at 118; Edward S. Corwin, The Schechter Case-Landmark
or What?, 13 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 151, 166 (1936) [hereinafter Landmark or What?].
53. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
54. See Act of Aug. 15, 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (1921) (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 181-229 (1992)).
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sent from one State with the exp ectation that they will end their
transit, after purchase, in another. 5
In its defense of the bill's constitutionality, the report of the House Com-
mittee on Agriculture relied heavily on Swift. Distinguishing Hopkins,
the report stated that "Congress in treating this question is attempting to
regulate evils which it had found to exist in respect to exorbitant charges
and unreasonable practices in the stockyards, resulting in a direct burden
on interstate commerce.""6
Floor debate over the bill's constitutionality focused on two issues:
first, whether the transactions taking place in the stockyards were in in-
terstate commerce, opponents wielding Hopkins while proponents bran-
dished Swift; and second, whether the stockyards were a business affected
with a public interest. However, the debates revealed more than merely a
congressional desire to comply with the requirements of the Commerce
Clause and the Fifth Amendment. Even as the legislators groped for
analogies, humorously debating whether the Chicago stockyards were
more like a railroad bridge or a hotel for pigs, a general understanding
that only businesses affected with a public interest were part of a feder-
ally regulable stream of commerce informed the colloquy.5 7 The Holme-
sian conflation of due process and Commerce Clause doctrines had
become a working premise of congressional constitutional thought.
Holmes' formula had become received doctrine in the judicial branch
as well, and the Act was accorded a warm reception before the high
Court. "Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice," the Court
declared in Stafford,
and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate
commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the Com-
merce Clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide
the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substi-
tute its judgment for that of Congress in such a matter unless the rela-
tion of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are
clearly non-existent.
58
Taken at face value, this pronouncement would seem to have wrought a
constitutional revolution beyond the wildest dreams of the most rabid
realist; and, indeed, had it been so understood, the events of 1937 would
lose some of their interest. Yet these words were not written by Holmes
or Brandeis, but by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, a man who,
though his health was failing badly in 1930, hesitated to resign from the
Court because he distrusted Herbert Hoover as a "progressive."5 9 The
55. § 2(b), 42 Stat. at 160.
56. H.R. Rep. No. 77, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 13-14 (1921).
57. See 61 Cong. Rec. 1804, 1813, 1868-73, 1886-87, 1928-30, 2670 (1921).
58. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922).
59. Mason & Beaney, supra note 4, at 162. Indeed, intracurial correspondence
reveals that Taft, Clarke, and Taft's fellow "conservative" Van Devanter formed the core
around which the Stafford supermajority was constructed. Taft sent Van Devanter a
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Court's deferential declaration must, therefore, be understood against the
backdrop of Holmes' formulation-a formulation with which the Staf-
ford analysis of the commerce power is suffused.
Taft initially identified as the goal of the Act the "unburdened flow" of
livestock from west to east, unencumbered by "exorbitant charges. '
The Chief Justice then proceeded to make his adoption of Holmes' for-
mulation explicit:
[T]he stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination. Thousands
of head of live stock arrive daily by carload and trainload lots, and
must be promptly sold and disposed of and moved out to give place to
the constantly flowing traffic that presses behind. The stockyards are
but a throat through which the current flows, and the transactions
which occur therein are only incident to this current [of commerce]
from the West to the East, and from one State to another. Such trans-
actions can not be separated from the movement to which they con-
tribute and necessarily take on its character. The commission men are
essential in making the sales without which the flow of the current
would be obstructed, and this, whether they are made to packers or
dealers. The dealers are essential to the sales to the stock farmers and
feeders. The sales are not in this aspect merely local transactions.
They create a local change of title, it is true, but they do not stop the
flow; they merely change the private interests in the subject of the cur-
rent, not interfering with, but, on the contrary, being indispensable to
its continuity. The origin of the live stock is in the West, its ultimate
destination known to, and intended by, all engaged in the business is in
the Middle West and East either as meat products or stock for feeding
and fattening. This is the definite and well-understood course of busi-
ness. The stockyards and the sales are necessary factors in the middle
of this current of commerce.61
draft of the Stafford opinion with a note saying, "I am sending this to you and Judge
Clarke, because we three are very clear in our judgment, and I would like the benefit of
your criticism before I send it on to other members of the Court who are more doubtful."
Letter From Chief Justice William H. Taft to Justice Willis Van Devanter re: Stafford v.
Wallace (Apr. 20, 1922) (on file with the Fordham Law Review and the Library of Con-
gress, Van Devanter MSS, Box 32).
60. See Stafford, 258 U.S. at 514-15.
The object to be secured by the Act is the free and unburdened flow of live stock
from the ranges and farms of the West and the Southwest through the great
stockyards and slaughtering centers on the borders of that region, and thence in
the form of meat products to the consuming cities of the country in the Middle
West and East, or still as live stock, to the feeding places and fattening farms in
the Middle West or East for further preparation for the market ... [An] evil
which [Congress] sought to provide against by the act, was exorbitant
charges.... Expenses incurred in the passage through the stockyards necessar-
ily reduce the price received by the shipper, and increase the price to be paid by
the consumer. If they be exorbitant or unreasonable, they are an undue burden
on the commerce which the stockyards are intended to facilitate. Any unjust or
deceptive practice or combination that unduly and directly enhances them is an
unjust obstruction to that commerce.
d. 61. Id. at 515-16 (emphasis added).
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Having described the stockyards in the very language of "indispens-
ability" he had used to characterize his third class of businesses affected
with a public interest in WolffPacking, Taft drew his conclusion:
The act, therefore, treats the various stockyards of the country as great
national public utilities to promote the flow of commerce from the
ranges and farms of the West to the consumers in the East. It assumes
that they conduct a business affected by a public use of a national char-
acter and subject to national regulation. That it is a business within
the power of regulation by legislative action needs no discussion. That
has been settled since the case of Munn v. Illinois.... The only ques-
tion here is whether the business done in the stockyards between the
receipt of the live stock and the shipment of them therefrom is a part
of interstate commerce, or is so associated with it as to bring it within
the power of national regulation. 6
2
Applying the principles set forth in Swift to the findings of fact repro-
duced above, Taft answered the question posed in the affirmative, up-
holding the Act as a valid exercise of the federal commerce power.
Justice McReynolds dissented without opinion, while Justice Day took
no part in the decision of the case. Justice Van Devanter, later to be
described, with Justice McReynolds, as one of the "Four Horsemen,"
voted with the majority.
A portion of Taft's discussion of Swift is worthy of some attention.
"The application of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution in the
Swift Case," wrote the Chief Justice,
was the result of the natural development of interstate commerce
under modem conditions. It was the inevitable recognition of the
great central fact that such streams of commerce from one part of the
country to another which are ever flowing are in their very essence the
commerce among the States and with foreign nations which histori-
cally it was one of the chief purposes of the Constitution to bring under
national protection and control. This court declined to defeat this pur-
pose in respect of such a stream and take it out of complete national
regulation by a nice and technical inquiry into the non-interstate char-
acter of some of its necessary incidents and facilities when considered
alone and without reference to their association with the movement of
which they were an essential but subordinate part.6 3
In this passage, one can see Taft squinting in the direction of New Deal
realism: the modem conditions of interstate commerce must be taken
into account; business activities should not be removed from the realm of
federal power by nice and technical inquiries. Yet Taft's squinting was
done through a set of conceptual lenses that limited the reach of his vi-
sion. In Taft's jurisprudential Weltanschauung, the distinction between
public and private enterprise was not nice and technical, but true and
immutable. Taft could speak expansively on judicial deference to con-
62. Id at 516-17 (emphasis added).
63. Id at 518-19.
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gressional determinations and somewhat realistically about interstate
commerce because he assumed the immutability of the jurisprudential
backdrop against which he spoke. So long as the essential categories of
laissez-faire formalism remained intact, and so long as the public/private
distinction informed Commerce Clause doctrine, the realism reflected in
the current of commerce doctrine posed no serious threat to the dual
federalist order.
B. The Grain Futures Act and Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen
The 1921 Congress also enacted the Future Trading Act," which
sought to regulate sales of grain futures on boards of trade by taxing such
sales at a prohibitive rate and then exempting from the tax all sales on
boards of trade complying with federal regulations. The Act was de-
clared an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power in Hill v. Wal-
lace.65 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Taft held that sales
of grain futures on boards of trade were not per se interstate commerce,
and that Congress therefore could not use its taxing power to regulate
indirectly a business activity not within federal control. In dicta, how-
ever, the Chief Justice all but requested that Congress pass an act
modeled on the Packers and Stockyards Act.66
Congress was not slow in responding to Taft's invitation. On Septem-
ber 21, 1922, the Grain Futures Act 67 became law. The Act adopted,
mutatis mutandis, the definition of commerce set forth in the Packers
and Stockyards Act.68 Moreover, section 3 of the Act explicitly charac-
64. See ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (amended by the Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42
Stat. 998 (1922)) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1992)).
65. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
66. Id. at 68-69.
There is not a word in the act from which it can be gathered that it is confined
in its operation to interstate commerce. The words "interstate commerce" are
not to be found in any part of the act from the title to the closing section...
[Congress] did not have the exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause in
mind and so did not introduce into the act the limitations which certainly
would accompany and mark an exercise of the power under the latter
clause.... It follows that sales for future delivery on the Board of Trade are not
in and of themselves interstate commerce. They can not come within the regu-
latory power of Congress as such, unless they are regarded by Congress, from
the evidence before it, as directly interfering with interstate commerce so as to
be an obstruction or a burden thereon (citation omitted). It was upon this prin-
ciple that in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, we held it to be within the power
of Congress to regulate business in the stockyards of the country, and include
therein the regulation of commission men and of traders there, although they
had to do only with sales completed and ended within the yards, because Con-
gress had concluded that through exorbitant charges, dishonest practices and
collusion they were likely, unless regulated, to impose a direct burden on the
interstate commerce passing through.
Id.
67. See ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (amended by the Commodity Exchange Act, ch.
545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936)) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1992)).
68. Section 2(b) provided in part: "a transaction in respect to any article shall be
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terized the sale of grain futures on boards of trade as a business "affected
with a national public interest. 69
The report of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry de-
fended the constitutionality of the bill on the authority of Swift, Stafford,
and New York and Chicago Grain & Stock Exchange v. Chicago Board of
Trade,7° wherein the Supreme Court of Illinois had held, invoking the
language of Munn, that "the floors of this exchange hall stand in the
gateway of commerce."'" Indeed, floor debate on the bill's constitution-
ality focused entirely on whether grain exchanges were located in a cur-
rent of interstate commerce. Even the bill's opponents conceded that
boards of trade were businesses affected with a public interest and ac-
cordingly subject to regulation by the governments of the states in which
they were located.72
The Grain Futures Act survived constitutional challenge in Board of
Trade of Chicago v. Olsen. 3 Writing for a seven-man majority,74 Chief
Justice Taft immediately located the grain exchange in a current of inter-
state commerce.75 Indeed, Taft noted, insofar as the case concerned "the
considered to be in interstate commerce if such article is part of that current of commerce
usual in the grain trade whereby grain and grain products and by-products thereof are
sent from one State with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in
another." 42 Stat. at 999.
69. I
Transactions in grain involving the sale thereof for future delivery as commonly
conducted on boards of trade and known as "futures" are affected with a na-
tional public interest... the transactions and prices of grain on such boards of
trade are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control, and sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations in the prices thereof frequently occur as a result of
such speculation, manipulation, or control, which are detrimental to the pro-
ducer or the consumer and the persons handling grain and products and by-
products thereof in interstate commerce, and that such fluctuations in prices are
an obstruction to and a burden upon interstate commerce in grain and the prod-
ucts and by-products thereof and render regulation imperative for the protec-
tion of such commerce and the national public interest therein.
IdL
70. 19 N.E. 855 (Il1. 1889).
71. S. Rep. No. 871, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1922).
72. See 61 Cong. Rec. 9404-07, 9411, 9423, 9430, 9440-41, 9447, 12,720-25 (1921).
73. 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
74. The "liberal" Brandeis, who joined Taft's opinion, was actually inclined to dis-
sent. "You will recall," he wrote Taft, "that I voted the other way and the opinion has
not removed my difficulties ... [b]ut I have differed from the Court recently on three
expressed dissents and concluded that in this case, I had better 'shut up.'" Alpheus T.
Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 201 (1965) (quoting Letter from Justice
Louis D. Brandeis to Chief Justice William H. Taft (Dec. 23, 1922)).
75. See Board of Trade of Chicago, 262 U.S. at 33.
The railroads of the country accommodate themselves to the interstate function
of the Chicago market by giving shippers from Western states bills of lading
through Chicago to points in Eastern states with the right to remove the grain
at Chicago for temporary purposes of storing, inspecting, weighing, grading, or
mixing, and changing the ownership, consignee or destination and then to con-
tinue the shipment under the same contract and at a through rate. Such a con-
tract does not... take [the grain] out of interstate commerce in such a way as
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cash grain, the sales to arrive, and the grain actually delivered in fulfill-
ment of future contracts," it was indistinguishable from Stafford.76 Ad-
dressing himself specifically to the effect of sales of grain futures on this
current of commerce, Taft formulated the questions before the Court as:
[W]hether the conduct of such sales is subject to constantly recurring
abuses which are a burden and obstruction to interstate commerce in
grain? And further, are they such an incident of that commerce and so
intermingled with it that the burden and obstruction caused therein by
them can be said to be direct?77
Echoing the deferential posture the Court had struck in Stafford, Taft
noted that Congress had specifically answered that question affirmatively
in the text of the Act. Reviewing the evidence before the Court, Taft
concluded that the Justices would have been unwarranted in rejecting
this finding of Congress as unreasonable. It was clear, he noted, that
"[m]anipulations of grain futures for speculative profit ... exert[ed] a
vicious influence and produce[d] abnormal and disturbing temporary
fluctuations of prices" that "disturb[ed] the normal flow of actual con-
signments."'78 By virtue of its singular capacity to exert such extraordi-
nary influence on wheat prices, the Court held, following Munn and
Stafford, that the Chicago Board of Trade was a business affected with a
national public interest, and was accordingly subject to federal
regulation.79
Justice McReynolds again dissented without opinion, this time joined
by Justice Sutherland, who had replaced Justice Clarke on October 2,
1922. Justice Van Devanter again voted with the majority, this time
joined by the man destined to become the Fourth Horseman: Justice
Pierce Butler who replaced Justice Day on January 3, 1923.
C. The Packers and Stockyards Act Revisited: Tagg Bros. &
Moorhead v. United States
The Packers and Stockyards Act came under attack again in Tagg
Bros. & Moorhead v. United States.8 0 The group of commission agencies
comprising the membership of the Omaha Livestock Exchange had es-
tablished rules requiring all members to charge the same rates for their
to deprive Congress of the power to regulate it, as is... expressly recognized in
Stafford v. Wallace.
Id. (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 34.
The sales on the Chicago Board of Trade are just as indispensable to the con-
tinuity of the flow of wheat from the West to the mills and distributing points of
the East and Europe, as are the Chicago sales of cattle to the flow of stock
toward the feeding places and slaughter and packing houses of the East.
Id. at 36.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 39.
79. See id. at 40-41.
80. 280 U.S. 420 (1930).
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services. The Exchange had promulgated a rate schedule to govern fees
charged by its members, effectively eliminating rate competition among
Omaha commission agencies. Pursuant to his authority under the Act,
the Secretary of Agriculture suspended the operation of the Exchange's
rate schedule and supplanted it with a schedule of his own making. The
members of the Exchange sought to enjoin the Secretary's action.
The plaintiffs conceded that they were engaged in interstate commerce
at a public stockyard and were therefore subject to some congressional
regulation."' They contended, however, that the rates charged for their
services could not be regulated because their business was not affected
with a public interest. 2 The plaintiffs argued essentially that only capi-
tal-intensive businesses could be affected with a public interest, that their
business was labor rather than capital-intensive, that rate-fixing for la-
bor-intensive businesses constituted wage-fixing in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, and that the commissions they charged for the sale of live-
stock therefore could not be regulated by Congress. 3
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Brandeis, unanimously
rejected the plaintiffs' contentions. "There is nothing in the nature of
monopolistic personal services," wrote Brandeis,
which makes it impossible to fix reasonable charges to be made there-
for; and there is nothing in the Constitution which limits the Govern-
ment's power of regulation to businesses which employ substantial
capital.... Plaintiffs perform an indispensable service in the interstate
commerce in live stock. They enjoy a substantial monopoly at the
Omaha Stock Yards.... The purpose of the regulation attacked is to
prevent their service from thus becoming an undue burden upon, and
obstruction of, that commerce.8 4
Tagg Bros. reaffirmed Holmes' conflation of Commerce Clause and
due process doctrines in an important way. The plaintiffs had sought to
drive a wedge between the current of commerce doctrine and the public/
private distinction, and the Court had unanimously rebuffed them. The
Court said, in effect, to be in the current of commerce was to be a busi-
ness affected with a public interest. Indeed, research has disclosed no
case in which the Court held that a business activity was located in a
current of commerce but was beyond congressional rate-regulation be-
cause it was not a business affected with a public interest.8 5 Within the
81. See id. at 433.
82. See icL at 437-38.
83. See id. at 438.
84. Id. at 438-39 (emphasis added) (citing Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 515-16
(1922); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 34 (1923)).
85. Indeed, the only case in which the current of commerce theory would have ap-
peared to be applicable but was nevertheless rejected by the Court was Hopkins v. United
States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898). The Kansas City Livestock Exchange was as clearly located
in a current of interstate commerce as were the Chicago stockyards in Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) and Stafford, 258 U.S. at 495, the Chicago Board of
Trade in Olsen, 262 U.S. at 1, and the Omaha Livestock Exchange in Tagg Bros. v.
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current of commerce doctrine, the conflation of the direct/indirect dis-
tinction with the public/private distinction was complete. When Edward
Corwin argued that the Supreme Court was attempting to convert the
direct/indirect distinction "into a sort of due process clause protective of
state power,"86 he wrote truer than he knew.
D. Other Salient Features of the Current of Commerce
The root distinction of dual federalism opposed that which was local
to that which was national. The dynamism of the current of commerce
doctrine lay in its capacity to compromise this root distinction. An
otherwise local business activity could be subjected to national regulation
if it could be characterized as a business affected with a public interest
located in a current of interstate commerce. Yet despite its dynamic po-
tential, current of commerce doctrine fit comfortably into the body of
early twentieth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence, largely because
it shared with that body of doctrine certain core assumptions about the
nature of the federal commerce power.
In the minds of the Taft Court Justices, Swift, Stafford, and Olsen
could happily co-exist with an array of cases that held a business activity
to be beyond federal regulation or within the regulatory power of a state
because it transpired at one of the terminals of a flow of interstate com-
merce. A few examples will suffice. In United Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Co.87 and United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel
Trunk Co.,8" the Court held labor strikes at a coal mine and a trunk
factory to be beyond the reach of federal jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act. In the absence of a showing of a specific intent to restrain com-
merce, the Court held, strikes by the employees of enterprises engaged in
production were local matters subject only to local regulation. 89 Com-
merce succeeded to production and was not a part of it. In Sonneborn
Bros. v. Cureton,90 the Court unanimously upheld a state wholesale sales
tax on oil which included in its base local sales of oil shipped to Texas
from outside the state. Rejecting the claim that the tax burdened inter-
state commerce in oil, the Court held that the oil had "come to rest"
within the state in the company's warehouse, where it was held for local
sale; and having thus become commingled with the general mass of prop-
erty within the state, the oil was subject to state taxation. 91 Two years
United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930). However, as Holmes pointed out in Swift, and as
Taft reiterated in Stafford, the Government in Hopkins had not shown that the Kansas
City commission merchants were capable of exacting exorbitant charges. The effect of
the merchants' activities on interstate commerce was therefore indirect.
86. Landmark or What?, supra note 52, at 159-60.
87. 259 U.S. 344, 350-53 (1922).
88. 265 U.S. 457, 469-71 (1924).
89. See id. at 469-71; United Mine Workers, 259 U.S. at 350-53.
90. 262 U.S. 506 (1923).
91. See id. at 508-09.
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later, in Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman,9 2 the Court upheld a New
York statute regulating the sale of kosher meats against the contention
that the regulation burdened interstate commerce. Once the meat had
come to rest within the state and was held solely for local disposition and
use, held the Court, it fell within the state's regulatory bailiwick, despite
the fact that the regulation might "incidentally affect interstate
commerce."
9 3
In these cases, as in the current of commerce cases and other com-
merce cases of the period, commerce was "conceived of primarily as
transportation."94 "In the light of the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court," wrote Professor Ribble of the University of Virginia in
1934, "interstate commerce may be fairly described as movement, sub-
ject, at least in part, to human direction or control, which movement
starts in one state and continues into another.""9 The Commerce Clause
jurisprudence of the period, noted Edward Corwin a year later, betrayed
"the Court's mental image of the interstate commerce process as a physi-
cal movement merely of goods from one state to another." '96 The current
of commerce doctrine, noted Ribble, sought to deal with "practices
which obstructed the flow of commerce among the states." ' The exist-
ence of such "obstructions" to the interstate movement or transportation
of goods, and the need for their removal, was the very focus of the doc-
trine.9" The current of commerce doctrine could peacefully co-exist with
Taft Court commerce jurisprudence because it rested on this conception
of commerce as physical movement. 99
Yet despite this apparently cozy fit, the current of commerce doctrine
contained within itself the potential for a terrific breach of interdoctrinal
harmony. For the current of commerce doctrine was necessarily a
slightly volatile exception to the pristine, symmetrical rules of dual feder-
alism. McReynolds in Stafford,"' joined by Sutherland in Olsen,"10 had
undoubtedly seen that it was an exception that could eventually swallow
the rules. The public/private distinction helped to hold this volatility in
check, but the fact remained that the current of commerce doctrine had
92. 266 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1925).
93. Id at 503.
94. Edward S. Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce a Crucial Constitu-
tional Issue, 18 Cornell L.Q. 477, 495 (1933).
95. F.D.G. Ribble, The 'Current of Commerce:" A Note on the Commerce Clause and
the National Industrial Recovery Act, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 296, 312 (1934) [hereinafter Rib-
ble, Current of Commerce].
96. Landmark or What?, supra note 52, at 166. See also Robert L. Stem, That Com-
merce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1336, 1347-48,
1360-61, 1363 (1934) (noting in defense of the NIRA that "although the Court has gener-
ally talked of interstate commerce as if it meant interstate movement, there has hereto-
fore been no need for a broader definition").
97. Ribble, Current of Commerce, supra note 95, at 314.
98. See id at 301-02, 316-17.
99. See Stem, supra note 96, at 1361.
100. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
101. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
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the capacity to transform the local into the national. The production/
commerce distinction was derived from the root local/national distinc-
tion, and the capacity to compromise the borders of the latter necessarily
entailed the power to compromise those of the former. Indeed, both
Swift and Stafford had suggested that the slaughter and packing of meat,
both activities of production, occurred in the current of commerce. 10 2
The Court had never suggested that a production facility located in a
current of interstate commerce caused a "break" in the current or was
otherwise beyond federal regulation. The dicta in Swift and Stafford inti-
mated that any tension between the current of commerce doctrine and
the production/commerce distinction would be resolved in favor of the
former. 10 3 To borrow a metaphor from contract bridge, the current of
commerce doctrine was trump.
The threat that the current of commerce doctrine posed to the produc-
tion/commerce distinction was not lost on contemporary commenta-
tors."° In his 1931 Presidential Address before the American Political
Science Association, Edward Corwin told his audience,
in "the typical and actual course of events," even manufacturing be-
comes but a stage in the flow of the raw product to the mill and the
out-flow of the finished product from the mill to the market; and while
checking momentarily the current of interstate commerce, is at the
same time, to adapt the words of Chief Justice Taft in Stafford v. Wal-
lace, "indispensable to its continuity."
°10 5
Discussing the current of commerce doctrine three years later, Corwin
reiterated this theme.
What we are called upon to vision is a current which has its source in
certain acts, or procedures, of production; which takes its way across
the country with ever increasing volume and without interruption by,
or even awareness of, state lines; which comes to pause now and again
in an eddy, as it were, for certain further operations and transactions,
including again acts of production (the preparation of meat products,
fattening on the farms), but which ever resumes its flow to its diverse
and nation-spread destination.' 0 6
Two years later, in 1936, writing for a lay audience on the eve of the CIO
sitdown strikes in the automobile industry, Robert Carr noted that
certain... enterprises, while not interstate in themselves, are neverthe-
less related to others that are, and for that reason become subject to
federal control. What, for instance, of the manufacture of
102. See Mason & Beaney, supra note 4, at 160-61; Joel F. Paschal, Mr. Justice Suther-
land 193-94 (1951).
103. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 520-21 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United States,
196 U.S. 375, 397-98 (1905).
104. See, e.g., Ribble, Current of Commerce, supra note 95, at 315 (discussing particu-
lar cases dealing with the production/commerce distinction).
105. Edward S. Corwin, Social Planning Under the Constitution, 26 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
1, 15 (1932) (citations omitted).
106. Twilight of the Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 43.
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automobiles? The construction of a Ford in Detroit is not interstate
commerce, but the steel and rubber and paint that make up the car are
brought to Detroit from a dozen different states, and the finished Fords
will be sent to every state in the Union, for sale. Clearly, the entire
process from beginning to end involves interstate commerce at a good
many points. Is this close relationship between the different steps that
make up the complete process sufficient to enable Congress to regulate
those steps that are not interstate along with those that are? 0 7
Carr would not have long to wait for an answer.
Born in 1905 and nurtured through the 1920s, by the beginning of the
New Deal decade Holmes' formula was a staple of American constitu-
tional jurisprudence. In the decade to come it would undergo significant
transformation, and by the decade's end it would be of little more than
historical interest. Before its demise, however, it was to serve as the con-
ceptual foundation of one of the more important events in the nation's
legal history.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF NEBBIA V. NEW YORK
At the same time that the Taft Court was elaborating the current of
commerce concept in constitutional law, another group of legal thinkers
was busily proposing reforms in American private law. The experience
and methodology of these private law reformers of the New Era of the
1920s would be reflected in the public law jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court during the New Deal of the 1930s.
In 1923, a group of the nation's most distinguished lawyers, jurists,
and law professors formed the American Law Institute.'08 Among the
founders were Charles Evans Hughes, former Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court," 9 Harlan Fiske Stone, Dean of Columbia University
School of Law, and Benjamin Cardozo, a judge on the New York Court
of Appeals."' Troubled by the uncertainty and complexity of the com-
mon law in America, the founders of the ALI proposed to undertake the
107. Robert K. Carr, Democracy and the Supreme Court 30 (1936).
108. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 676 (2d ed. 1985); Her-
bert F. Goodrich & Paul A. Wolkin, The Story of the American Law Institute 1923-1961,
at 5 (1961); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Natural-
ism and the Problem of Value 79-90 (1973); Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the
Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 Iowa L. Rev. 19, 19-41 (1929); Norris
Darrell & Paul A. Wolkin, The American Law Institute, 52 N.Y.S.BJ. 99, 99-101, 139-43
(1980); N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the
American Law Institute, 8 L. & Hist. Rev. 55, 55-96 (1990); William P. La Piana, 'A Task
of No Common Magnitude: The Founding of the American Law Institute, 11 Nova L
Rev. 1085, 1085-1126 (1987); William D. Lewis, History of the American Law Institute
and the First Restatement of the Law: 'How We Did It', in American Law Institute Re-
statement in the Courts: Permanent Edition 1932-1944, at 1-4 (1945); Herbert Wechs-
ler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 147-151 (1969).
109. See Wechsler, supra note 108, at 147.
110. See Goodrich & Wolkin, supra note 108, at 5-6.
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enormously ambitious task of "restating" it.I" The inauguration of the
National Reporter system in the 1870s had, by the 1920s, produced an
avalanche of reported decisions "that made it impossible for judges and
lawyers to stay properly informed.""' 2 The founders of the institute be-
lieved that "out of the overwhelming mass of law cases and legal litera-
ture clearer statements of the rules of the common law in effect in a great
majority of the states could be made and expressed."' 1 3 This would re-
quire that "the thousands upon thousands of decisions of courts be re-
duced to a systematic, concise statement of the law.""' 4
Many of the chief draftsmen on the Restatement projects, such as Sa-
muel Williston and Austin Scott, were the authors of "massive treatises
in the strict, conceptual, Langdell mold""' 5 and the task of "restating"
the law, while not necessarily a formalist exercise, 116 was of course a
Langdellian enterprise.' 17 The Restaters would take a complex and un-
wieldy body of case law and extract from it its essential elements; from
the thousands of reported cases on a given area of the law they would
synthesize lean and clear rules of general application. Beginning with the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts"I8 in 1932, the Institute published a
series of Restatements of the principal areas of the common law:
Agency1 in 1933, Torts 120 and Conflict of Laws 121 in 1934, and Trusts in
1935.122 Between 1928 and 1935, the ALI also published tentative drafts
of Restatements for the areas of Business Associations, Property and Sales
of Land.123 Just as the Supreme Court was confronting the issues of the
I 11. See id. at 5-11; Purcell, supra note 108, at 79-80.
112. Purcell, supra note 108, at 79.
113. Goodrich & Wolkin, supra note 108, at 15.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Friedman, supra note 108, at 676. On the legal thought and influence of Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell, see William La Piana, Logic and Experience: American Legal
Thought and Legal Education, 1800-1920, at 154-82 (1987) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University) (forthcoming Spring, 1993, Oxford University Press).
116. Hull persuasively argues that many of the Restaters were not full-fledged
Langdellian devotees of legal science, but instead transitional figures positioned between
formalism and realism. She uses the term "progressive-pragmatist" to describe Cardozo
and others, and the term might, with some qualification, also be used to describe Hughes,
Stone, Brandeis, and perhaps Roberts. All trained in the "heyday of formalism," their
jurisprudence retained an air of Langdellian conceptualism. See Hull, supra note 108, at
84. Yet they were not thoroughgoing formalists. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934) (discussed infra notes 124-137 and accompanying text). Indeed, they were
able to deformalize their jurisprudence at the same time that they were engaged in the
essentially Langdellian enterprise of synthesizing the disparate doctrinal formulations of
existing cases into lean rules of general application. In other words, "formalist" will not
suffice as a complete description of Langdellianism. See Hull, supra note 108, at 83-85.
117. See Friedman, supra note 108, at 676; Purcell, supra note 108, at 75-80.
118. See Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1932).
119. See Restatement of the Law of Agency (1933).
120. See Restatement of the Law of Torts (1934).
121. See Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1934).
122. See Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1935); Wechsler, supra note 108, at 147.
123. See Restatement of the Law of Business Associations (Tentative Draft No. 1,
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constitutionality of the New Deal, the ALl was proceeding apace with
the Langdelian task of restating the common law.
By 1934, Hughes, Stone, and Cardozo, founders of the Restatement
projects, had taken seats on the United States Supreme Court. By that
year, it appears that these charter members of the Restatement move-
ment, who came to legal maturity in the era of Langdellian hegemony,
had begun to impress the Restatement methodology upon the nation's
constitutional law.
Nowhere was this impact more evident than in the case of Nebbia v.
New York.124 Nebbia involved a New York State Control Board regula-
tion of retail milk prices. The regulation was an attempt to ameliorate
the effects of cutthroat competition in the retail milk business, where
price-cutting had reduced the income of dairy farmers to a level below
the cost of production. Leo Nebbia, a retailer convicted of selling milk
below the price prescribed by state regulation, argued that the regulation
deprived him of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Price regulation, Nebbia contended, was con-
stitutional only as applied to a business affected with a public interest.
For a business to be affected with a public interest, he argued, it had to be
either a public utility or a natural monopoly. Because neither Nebbia's
business itself nor the milk industry as a whole belonged to either of these
categories, Nebbia contended that his business was not affected with a
public interest and therefore was not subject to price regulation. 25
The Court, by a vote of five to four (the Four Horsemen-McReyn-
olds, Sutherland, Van Devanter and Butler-dissenting), rejected
Nebbia's contentions, and in so doing effectively retired the formalist dis-
tinction between public and private enterprise.' 26 The Court declined to
resolve the dispute by reference to abstract categories. Instead, Justice
Roberts' opinion presented a lengthy survey of instances in which exer-
cises of the police power had been sustained both generally'27 and in the
regulation of prices.128 Price regulation had been upheld with respect to
railroads,129 grain elevators, 130 premiums for fire insurance,13 ' interest
rates,132 compensation of insurance agents, 33 attorneys' contingent
1928); Restatement of the Law of Property (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1929); Restatement of
the Law of Sales of Land (Tentative Draft 1935).
124. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
125. See id at 531.
126. Justice Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion, "paced the floor of his Washing-
ton home till the early hours of the morning before he finally decided how he should
vote." Constitutional Revolution, Ltd., supra note 4, at 75-76.
127. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 521-30.
128. See ia at 531-37.
129. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876); Peik v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1876).
130. See Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 (1894); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876).
131. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
132. See Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 (1910).
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fees, 134 stockyards, 135 and private contract carriers. 136 From this array
of exceptions to what was arguably a general rule against price regula-
tion, Justice Roberts distilled a general principle. "It is clear," he wrote,
"that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a
public interest. ... The phrase, 'affected with a public interest' can, in the
nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate rea-
son, is subject to control for the public good."' 137
Nebbia's dismantling of the public/private distinction is a milestone in
American constitutional development, and it merits some observations
relevant to our inquiry. First, Nebbia destroyed one of the central tenets
of laissez-faire formalism before the announcement of the Court-packing
plan, before the 1936 election and, indeed, before the 1934 election.
Hughes, who voted with the majority, and Roberts, who authored the
opinion, are both generally considered to have been the crucial swing
votes in 1937. In Nebbia, they thus evinced an inclination to deviate
from laissez-faire values and formalist styles of thinking long before
Roosevelt's crushing defeat of Alf Landon.
Second, and more important, the breakdown of the public/private dis-
tinction signalled by Nebbia held dramatic potential consequences for
Commerce Clause doctrine. The current of commerce doctrine was es-
sentially a realist conception restrained by a formal one. The current of
commerce, we recall, was conceived as a sequence of interstate business
activities connected by intrastate business activities affected with a public
interest. As long as the class of business activities affected with a public
interest remained small, the channel cut by the current of commerce
promised to remain narrow. Because Nebbia threw the class of busi-
nesses affected with a public interest wide open, the internal logic of the
current of commerce doctrine impelled the court toward a recognition of
a broader conception of the current of commerce. Nebbia made it possi-
ble to conceptualize what had previously been considered purely private
enterprises as businesses affected with a public interest. This in turn
made it possible to locate such business activities in a current of com-
merce subject to federal control.
Moreover, Nebbia demonstrated that the Court was inclined to look to
the effects exerted by a business activity rather than to the nature of the
business considered in a vacuum, and to examine the business pragmati-
cally rather than metaphysically-in short, to treat the public/private
distinction more realistically and less formally. This inclination
prefigured the Court's retreat from a formalistic understanding of the
133. See O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
134. See Margolin v. United States, 269 U.S. 93 (1925); Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540
(1925); Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170 (1920); Newman v. Moyers, 253 U.S. 182
(1920); Capital Trust Co. v. Calhoun, 250 U.S. 208 (1919); Frisbie v. United States, 157
U.S. 160 (1895).
135. See Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
136. See Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
137. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
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distinction between direct and indirect burdens on commerce. The im-
pact of this new understanding of the public/private distinction on the
direct/indirect distinction would be realized, however, only within the
framework of the doctrine within which the two distinctions had become
conflated. Only within the context of a dispute which could be conceptu-
alized as a current of commerce case would Nebbia's ramifications for
Swift's internal logic be worked out. For want of such an appropriately
tailored case, the impact of Nebbia on Commerce Clause doctrine re-
mained latent for the next three years. However, in 1937, the fallout
from Nebbia was to be felt in a dramatic and often misunderstood way.
III. INTERLUDE: SCHECHTER POULTRY CORP. V. UNITED STATES
AND CARTER V CARTER COAL
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 3 involved the conviction of a
Brooklyn slaughterhouse operator for several violations of the "Live
Poultry Code." '139 Promulgated pursuant to the National Industrial Re-
covery Act ("NIRA"),14 the Code contained provisions establishing, in-
ter alia, minimum wages and maximum hours of labor.
The Schechter Poultry Corporation was a slaughterhouse operator
that purchased live poultry from commission men in New York City and
Philadelphia, slaughtered the purchased poultry at its Brooklyn
slaughterhouse, and then sold the slaughtered poultry to local retail poul-
try dealers and butchers for direct sale to consumers. The corporation
did not sell poultry in interstate commerce. The principals of the corpo-
ration were convicted of violating, inter alia, the provisions of the Code
pertaining to minimum wages and maximum hours.
The lawyers in the Justice Department had not intended for Schechter
to be the case in which the Court would determine the constitutionality
of the NIRA. The Department had been preparing United States v.
Belcher,14 1 a prosecution for violation of the wage and hour provisions of
the Lumber and Timber Code, to serve as the NIRA test case. As the
April 8, 1935, date for Supreme Court oral argument approached, how-
ever, Department lawyers began to doubt the prudence of using Belcher
as the vehicle for a constitutional test. Due both to doubts concerning
the Lumber Code's constitutionality and the lack of a full trial record,
the Department requested on March 25 that the case be dismissed. The
Court granted the Department's motion to dismiss the following week. 142
138. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
139. The full title of the Code was the "Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry
Industry of the Metropolitan Area in and about the City of New York." Id. at 519 n.l.
140. See Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (amended 1935) (history of
the Act at 15 U.S.C. §§ 703, 744 (1992)).
141. Appeal dismissed, 294 U.S. 736 (1935).
142. See Thomas I. Emerson, Young Lawyer for the New Deal 24 (Joan P. Emerson
ed., 1991); Peter H. Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 75-82 (1982).
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The failure of NRA 14 3 and Department lawyers to formulate "a coher-
ent litigation strategy pointed toward a strong, well-prepared constitu-
tional test case"'" left the administration without any promising test
vehicles on the horizon. The NIRA was due to expire by its own terms
in June and, as the New York Times and numerous other anti-NRA com-
mentators observed, the administration was "now in the indefensible po-
sition of urging Congress to extend with slight modifications an act the
constitutionality of which it is deliberately refusing to test. 1' 45 Fortui-
tously, the Second Circuit upheld the Schechters' conviction on the very
day that Belcher was dismissed. 146 Due to the lateness in the Court's
term, however, the case would not be heard until the following autumn
unless the Government requested expedited review. The statute might,
in the meantime, expire or be re-enacted in modified form, and the neces-
sity for a constitutional test might in some manner be avoided. Donald
Richberg, however, was able to convince Roosevelt that "the morale of
the [NRA], already at a low ebb in coping with the herculean task of
enforcement and facing widespread noncompliance, could not endure
any further temporizing." " 4" Thus, against the advice of Felix Frank-
furter and Tommy Corcoran, Solicitor General Reed requested expedited
appeal April 11.148
Justice Department lawyers doubted from the beginning that the
Schechters' slaughterhouse operations fell within the federal regulatory
bailiwick. In particular, Department attorneys "were uneasy about the
evidentiary underpinnings of the Commerce Clause argument. They rec-
ognized that reliance on the expansive line of Supreme Court precedent
required a showing of some 'burden' on an uninterrupted 'stream of com-
merce.' ""I Solicitor General Reed warned Roosevelt that Schechter in-
volved "wages and hours of slaughter house employees after poultry has
been received in New York, and not hours and wages involved in inter-
state transportation. This is the most difficult type of labor provision to
maintain."' 5° Even Blackwell Smith, acting general counsel to the NRA,
thought Schechter was "the weakest possible case."' 15
The nine Justices of the Supreme Court could not have agreed more.
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court unanimously
143. The "National Recovery Administration," the agency charged with the duty of
administering the NIRA. See Irons, supra note 142, at 27.
144. Id. at 85.
145. Id. at 82 (quoting N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1935, at 20).
146. See United States v. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
147. Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes As Chief Justice, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 32
(1967).
148. See id.; Irons, supra note 142, at 83-85.
149. Irons, supra note 142, at 91.
150. Id. at 85 (quoting Letter From Solicitor General Stanley F. Reed to President
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Apr. 11, 1935)).
151. Id. See also Emerson, supra note 142, at 25 (commerce issue not raised in
favorable form).
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reversed the convictions. The Court first held that, because the NIRA
was an unconstitutional delegation of authority, the Code enacted pursu-
ant to this authority was void. Second, the Court held that, even were
the Code otherwise a valid regulation, it could not constitutionally be
applied to the defendants. Since the defendants were not engaged in in-
terstate commerce, their activities were beyond the reach of federal regu-
lation. "The undisputed facts," wrote Hughes,
afford no warrant for the argument that the poultry handled by de-
fendants at their slaughterhouse markets was in a "current" or "flow"
of interstate commerce and was thus subject to congressional regula-
tion. The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities
into a State does not mean that the flow continues after the property
has arrived and has become commingled with the mass of property
within the State and is there held solely for local disposition and use.
So far as the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow in inter-
state commerce had ceased. The poultry had come to a permanent rest
within the State. It was not held, used, or sold by defendants in rela-
tion to any further transactions in interstate commerce and was not
destined for transportation to other States. Hence, decisions which
deal with a stream of interstate commerce-where goods come to rest
within a State temporarily and are later to go forward in interstate
commerce---and with the regulations of transactions involved in that
practical continuity of movement, are not applicable here.15 2
Nor, the Court held, did the defendants' transactions exert a direct effect
on interstate commerce. The Government argued that a slaughterhouse
operator paying lower wages or reducing his overhead through exacting
long hours of work was enabled to cut his prices, and that such cuts in
prices generated a demand for cheaper goods and demoralized the price
structure, thereby affecting interstate commerce.1 53 These effects on in-
terstate commerce, the Court held, were merely indirect." Indeed,
Hughes stated, were such effects considered direct, "the extent of the
regulation of cost would be a question of discretion and not of power."' 55
Justice Cardozo fied a concurring opinion in which Justice Stone
joined. Cardozo agreed that the NIRA constituted an unlawful delega-
tion of authority, but he also registered "another objection, far-reaching
152. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543 (1935).
153. See id at 548-49.
154. See id at 547-51.
155. Id at 549. Hughes elaborated:
If the federal government may determine the wages and hours of employees in
the internal commerce of a State, because of their relation to cost and prices and
their indirect effect upon interstate commerce, it would seem that a similar con-
trol might be exerted over other elements of cost, also affecting prices, such as
the number of employees, rents, advertising, methods of doing business, etc. All




and incurable." '156 Regarding the power of Congress to regulate com-
merce, Cardozo wrote:
I find no authority in that grant for the regulation of wages and hours
of labor in the ... defendants' business. As to this feature of the case
little can be added to the opinion of the court. There is a view of
causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is na-
tional and what is local in the activities of commerce.... Activities
local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because
of distant repercussions.
157
"To find immediacy or directness here," wrote Cardozo, "is to find it
almost everywhere."' 58
The unanimity of the decision impressed contemporary commentators.
Edward Corwin noted with some consternation that even the "liberal"
members of the Court appeared to be thinking about the commerce
power in formalist terms rather than the realist terms of some younger
legal thinkers. "In a word," wrote Corwin, "the conceptualism, the de-
termination to resist the inrush of fact with the besom of formula, which
pervades the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court, is not altogether ab-
sent from Justice Cardozo's opinion." '159 "When men like Stone, Car-
dozo, Brandeis and Hughes believe that the Constitution compels them
to decide, as they did in this case," wrote the New Republic, "there is no
point any longer in saying that the Constitution is infinitely flexible." 1"
One might question the New Republic's conclusion without doubting its
premise. The Constitution itself may or may not possess considerable
elasticity; but in practice it is malleable only to the extent that its authori-
tative interpreters believe it to be so. Though Cardozo was beginning to
offer a less rigidly formal way of thinking about commerce power is-
sues,' he and his colleagues had inherited modes of thinking about
156. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 554.
158. Id.
159. Landmark or What?, supra note 52, at 170.
160. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval 284 (1960) (quoting The
New Republic, June 12, 1935).
161. Cardozo in his concurring opinion had observed that "[a] society such as ours 'is
an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout its territory; the only question
is of their size'. . . . The law is not indifferent to considerations of degree." Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted). He nevertheless betrayed his embrace of formalist categories by re-
marking, "[to find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost everywhere." Id.
(emphasis added). Sensitivity to considerations of degree would later be blended with
current of commerce jurisprudence to create a transitional Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence for the late 1930s. See the Wagner Act Cases (discussed infra notes 195-271 and
accompanying text); see also NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (upholding applica-
tion of the Wagner Act "to employers, who are engaged in a relatively small business of
processing materials which are transmitted to them by the owners through the channels
of interstate commerce and which after processing are distributed through those chan-
nels"); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938) (holding that a
California fruit-packing plant receiving fresh fruit from points within the state and subse-
quently shipping a substantial portion of its packaged products to points outside the state
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commerce power issues that were simply incompatible with the ways that
Government attorneys were (and subsequent Supreme Court Justices
would soon be) thinking about those issues. 62 Corwin and the editors at
The New Republic were sensitive to the fact that the intellectual styles
that these aging Justices had inherited from an earlier era played a criti-
cal role in the New Deal saga.
In the wake of the Schechter decision, Congress enacted the Bitumi-
nous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 (the "Guffey Coal Act").'63 The
statute's introductory section detailed the circumstances thought to jus-
tify the Act. That section declared, among other things, that the mining
and distribution of bituminous coal throughout the United States were
affected with a national public interest, that the production and distribu-
tion of coal by producers directly affected interstate commerce, and that
the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively over terms of
employment was necessary in order to avoid the recurring obstructions
to interstate commerce in coal caused by labor disputes at the mines."M
Section 4 of the Act set out the substantive provisions in controversy.
Part II of that section authorized a National Bituminous Coal Commis-
sion to regulate the price at which bituminous coal was sold in interstate
commerce. 165 Part III of section 4 conferred upon the employees of coal
producers the right to organize and to bargain collectively, and created a
labor board to adjudicate labor disputes in the coal industry.",
The Wagner Act, which was also enacted in the wake of the Schechter
decision, sailed through Congress with comparative ease and was passed
by large majorities in both Houses. 67 The Guffey Coal Act was not to
have such an easy go of it. Hearings held before a subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee in June of 1935 focused primarily on
the question of the bill's constitutionality. The subcommittee requested
Attorney General Cummings and Solicitor General Reed to appear and
offer their views concerning the bill's constitutional basis.' 6 Lawyers in
the Justice Department were convinced that the bill was unconstitutional
in light of Schechter, 69 and, according to an unconfirmed report, had
was subject to the Wagner Act). Soon, however, the Court in its Commerce Clause juris-
prudence would both completely abandon its adherence to the formal categories of dual
federalism and become completely insensitive to questions of degree. See Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
162. See e.g., id at 128-29 (holding that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the
power to regulate prices of production of wheat intended solely for consumption, and not
for commerce).
163. See Ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (1925) (repealed 1937, as noted in 15 U.S.C. §§ 801-
827).
164. See id. at 991-92, § 1.
165. See id. at 995-1001, § 4, part II.
166. See id, at 1001-02, § 4, part III.
167. See discussion of the Wagner Act, infra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
168. See Ralph Baker, The National Bituminous Coal Commission 49-50 (1941).
169. See Irons, supra note 142, at 248.
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told Cummings as much before his appearance. 170 Cummings refused to
opine concerning the bill's constitutionality, instead advising the subcom-
mittee "to push it [the bill] through and leave the question to the
courts."
' 17 1
On July 5th, the day of Cummings' appearance before the subcommit-
tee, President Roosevelt sent a letter to the chairman of the subcommit-
tee, Samuel B. Hill, pleading for a favorable recommendation.
"Admitting that mining coal, considered separately and apart from its
distribution in the flow of interstate commerce, is an intrastate transac-
tion," wrote the President,
the constitutionality of the provisions based on the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution depends upon the final conclusion as to whether
production conditions directly affect, promote, or obstruct interstate
commerce in the commodity. Manifestly, no one is in a position to
give assurance that the proposed act will withstand constitutional tests
•.. [but] all doubts should be resolved in favor of the bill, leaving to
the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate question of constitution-
ality.... I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to constitu-
tionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation. 172
Though four of the seven members of the subcommittee continued to
believe the bill to be unconstitutional, the White House was able to get
the bill reported to the full House Ways and Means Committee "without
recommendation." 173
The bill faced similar difficulties in the full Committee. Eight of the
Committee's eighteen Democrats and six of its seven Republicans were
known to oppose the bill. The Democratic members of the Committee
held a series of secret meetings throughout early August in an attempt to
muster enough votes to secure a favorable report. On August 12, a meet-
ing of the full Committee was held at which the bill was reported favora-
bly by a vote of twelve to eleven. As Representative Allen Treadway of
North Carolina remarked, "[t]his was made possible by the simple expe-
dient of having two members of the majority party withdraw their nega-
tive votes and answer 'Present.' ",'74
The report of the minority focused almost exclusively on the question
of the bill's constitutionality. Representative Jere Cooper of Tennessee
filed with the minority report a brief against the bill in which four of his
colleagues concurred. Cooper contended that the current of commerce
cases could offer no constitutional support for the bill. "In the Schechter
case," Cooper argued,
170. See Baker, supra note 168, at 50 (citing N.Y. Times, July 6, 1935, at 2).
171. Id.
172. Letter From President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Subcommittee Chairman Samuel
B. Hill (July 5, 1935), reprinted in 79 Cong. Rec. 13,449 (1935).
173. Baker, supra note 168, at 51; 79 Cong. Rec. 13,437 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Allen
Treadway of North Carolina).
174. Baker, supra note 168, at 51; 79 Cong. Rec. 13,437 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Allen
Treadway of North Carolina).
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it was pointed out that when poultry was trucked to slaughterhouses in
Brooklyn for local disposition, it became commingled with the mass of
property within the State, and the flow of interstate commerce
ceased.... In the case of mining or producing coal, interstate com-
merce has not even commenced, so the coal is still a part of the mass of
the property of the State of its production until it commences its final
movement for transportation from the State of its origin to that of its
destination.
175
In the floor debates on the bill, members of both Houses repeatedly
contested proponents' claims that the Commerce Clause authorized con-
gressional regulation of coal mining.176 Representative Allen Treadway
of North Carolina produced a lengthy argument distinguishing the min-
ing of coal from the activities regulated in the current of commerce cases.
Like the local sale of poultry, coal mining occurred at one of the termi-
nals of the current of commerce. Citing Schechter's dismissal of the cur-
rent of commerce argument, Treadway contended that "[i]f decisions
which deal with a stream of interstate commerce have no relevancy in a
case where interstate commerce has ended, then it would seem that they
would have no relevancy in a case where interstate commerce has not
begun. ' 177 Swift provided no more authority for congressional regula-
tion of the production of coal at the mine than it did for federal regula-
tion of production of cattle on the farm. 178 The current of commerce
decisions authorized federal regulation of local activities only in instances
in which such activities were located in a current of interstate commerce.
Coal mining was not so situated. 179
The closeness of the final votes on the bill reflected the seriousness of
the legislators' constitutional doubts. Though Republicans now held
fewer than thirty percent of the seats in the House,' the bill was passed
by the comparatively narrow margin of 194-168.181 In the Senate, where
Democrats now held sixty-nine of the ninety-six seats, 82 the bill
squeaked through by a vote of 45-37.183 Despite considerable adminis-
tration pressure, both public and private, a substantial number of Demo-
crats defied the President. 184 In light of the comparatively large margins
by which the Wagner Act was passed, it seems unlikely that the negative
175. 79 Cong. Rec. 12,461 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Jere Cooper of Tennessee).
176. See 79 Cong. Rec. 13,435-37, 13,481-85 (1935) (Rep. Treadway); 13,438 (Rep.
Cox); 13,446-48 (Rep. Knutson); 13,457-60 (Rep. Fuller); 13,460-65 (Rep. Cooper);
13,465 (Rep. McCormack); 13,466-69 (Rep. Church); 13,568 (Rep. Hobbs); 13,771-73
(Sen. Tydings); 14,066 (Sen. Connally); 14,073 (Sen. King); 14,083 (Sen. Walsh).
177. 79 Cong. Rec. 13,482 (1935).
178. See 79 Cong. Rec. 13,482 (1935).
179. See 79 Cong. Rec. 13,483 (1935).
180. See William E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932-
1940, at 116 [hereinafter Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt].
181. See 79 Cong. Rec. 13,666-67 (1935).
182. See Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 180, at 116.
183. See 79 Cong. Rec. 14,084 (1935).
184. See Baker, supra note 168, at 51-52.
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votes were motivated by any general animosity toward federal regulation
of labor relations. Many members of Congress sincerely doubted the
constitutionality of the Guffey Coal Act but not that of the Wagner Act.
The Supreme Court would soon vindicate the doubts of the minority.
In an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the Court held that Part III
of the Act was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to regulate labor
relations in the purely local activity of coal production.18 5 Denying the
applicability of Swift and Stafford, the Court remarked:
It was nowhere suggested in these cases that the interstate commerce
power extended to the growth or production of the things which, after
production, entered the flow.... The restricted field covered by the
Swift and kindred cases is illustrated by the Schechter case.... There
the commodity in question, although shipped from another state, had
come to rest in the state of its destination, and, as the Court pointed
out, was no longer in a current or flow of interstate commerce. The
Swift doctrine was rejected as inapposite. In the Schechter case the
flow had ceased. Here it had not begun. The difference is not one of
substance. The applicable principle is the same.1 86
The local production of coal was neither itself interstate commerce, nor
was it part of a current of commerce, nor, the Court held, did it directly
affect interstate commerce.187 Despite the Act's severability clause, the
Court held that Part III was not separable from the price-regulation pro-
visions of Part II1188 Accordingly, the majority struck down the Act in
its entirety.' 8 9
Chief Justice Hughes filed a separate opinion in which he agreed that
production preceded commerce and was therefore a subject of state
rather than federal control.' 90 Hughes believed that Part II was separa-
ble from Part III, however, and therefore would have affirmed the por-
tion of the lower court's opinion upholding the price-regulation
provisions of the Act.'
Most interesting, however, was an aside tucked away in Hughes' dis-
cussion of the federal commerce power: "We are not at liberty," he
wrote, "to deny to the Congress, with respect to interstate commerce, a
power commensurate with that enjoyed by the States in the regulation of
their internal commerce. See Nebbia v. New York."' 192 Hughes' pro-
phetic citation of Nebbia in the context of a discussion of the commerce
power indicated his recognition that Nebbia had expanded the class of
businesses affected with a national public interest as well as that of busi-
nesses affected with the public interest of a state.
185. See Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936).
186. Id. at 305-06.
187. See id. at 308-09.
188. See id. at 316.
189. See id. at 316-17.
190. See id. at 317.
191. See id. at 321-22.
192. Id. at 319 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
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Justice Cardozo filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stone and
Brandeis joined. Cardozo contended that Part II of the Act was a proper
regulation of interstate commerce, that Part II was separable from Part
III, and that, insofar as no controversy between the coal producers and
their employees had yet materialized with respect to the provisions of
Part III, the employers' suits sought a premature declaration regarding
Part IIIs validity. 193 Cardozo did hint at one point in his opinion that
there might have been limited circumstances in which federal regulation
of the miners' wages might have been constitutional.' However, it is
safe to say that, as of the time the Carter decision was rendered, no mem-
ber of the Court had gone on record positively stating that the federal
government had the power to regulate the labor relations of local enter-
prises engaged in production.
It is quite likely that the activity involved in Schechter could have been
considered a business affected with a public interest within the meaning
of Nebbia; it is almost certain that the production of coal could have been
so considered. Yet in both cases the potentially revolutionary impact of
Nebbia on Commerce Clause doctrine, hinted at in Hughes' Carter opin-
ion, could not be realized because the business activities in question could
not be located within a current of interstate commerce. The following
year, however, the Court would hear three cases through which the po-
tential of Nebbia could be tapped.
IV. THE WAGNER ACT CASES
A. Framing the Act
The drafting of earlier New Deal statutes, such as the NIRA and the
AAA, had been dominated by politicians, bureaucrats, and lobbyists who
had paid little attention to thorny questions of constitutionality. 95 By
contrast, each of the drafters of the Wagner Act was a lawyer, 96 and the
legal training of the Act's framers was reflected by the central role that
constitutional concerns played in their shaping of the Act's provisions.
Introduced in the Senate by Wagner on February 21, 1935, S. 1958
reflected the influence exerted by the current of commerce cases on the
thought of its drafters. The bill stated in its Declaration of Policy that
denials of the right to bargain collectively led
to strikes and other manifestations of economic strife, which create
further obstacles to the free flow of commerce. It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the United States to remove obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to provide for the general welfare by encourag-
ing the practice of collective bargaining. 7
193. See id. at 324.
194. See iL at 327-28.
195. See Irons, supra note 142, at 227.
196. See idl
197. S. 1958, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the
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The term "affecting commerce" was defined to mean "in commerce, or
burdening or affecting commerce, or obstructing the free flow of com-
merce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute that might
burden or affect commerce or obstruct the free flow of commerce." 198
An accompanying memorandum comparing the bill to its predecessor in
the 73rd Congress noted that "[d]enials of the right to bargain collec-
tively through freely chosen representatives lead to strikes and other eco-
nomic strife, thus creating physical and other obstructions to the flow of
interstate commerce."1 99 The same memorandum repeatedly cited the
Packers and Stockyards Act and the Grain Futures Act as models for the
bill's provisions, and Stafford200 and Olsen20 as precedents bolstering
the bill's constitutionality. 20 2
The current of commerce language in the bill's Declaration of Policy,
however, was preceded by a broader commerce power justification for
the bill. The Declaration stated that inequality of bargaining power ob-
tained in instances in which employees were not free to organize and
bargain collectively, and that "the resultant failure to maintain equilib-
rium between the rate of wages and the rate of industrial expansion im-
pairs economic stability and aggravates recurrent depressions, with
consequent detriment to the general welfare and to the free flow of com-
merce."2 °3 The language of this purchasing power theory was revised in
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 2 4 but the theory itself
National Labor Relations Act, 1935, at 1295, 1295 (1985) [hereinafter 1 NLRB, Legisla-
tive History].
198. Id. at 1297.
199. Comparison of S. 2926 (73rd Congress) and S. 1958 (74th Congress) Senate Com-
mittee Print, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History,
supra note 197, at 1319, 1338.
200. See 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
201. See 262 U.S. 1 (1922).
202. See 1 NLRB, Legislative History, supra note 197, at 1339-42, 1347-48, 1358.
203. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History,
supra note 197, at 1295. Identical language may be found in competing versions of the
bill. See H.R. Rep. No. 6187, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, at 2445 (1985) [hereinafter 2 NLRB,
Legislative History]; H.R. Rep. No. 6288, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2
NLRB, Legislative History, supra, at 2459.
204. The Committee's reformulation of the purchasing power theory stated:
The inequality of bargaining power between employer and individual employees
which arises out of the organization of employers in corporate forms of owner-
ship and out of numerous other modem industrial conditions, impairs and af-
fects commerce by creating variations and instability in wage rates and working
conditions within and between industries and by depressing the purchasing
power of wage earners in industry, thus increasing the disparity between pro-
duction and consumption, reducing the amount of commerce, and tending to
produce and aggravate recurrent business depressions. The protection of the
right of employees to organize and bargain collectively tends to restore equality
of bargaining power and thereby fosters, protects, and promotes commerce
among the several States.
S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History,
supra note 203, at 2285-86. Identical language may be found in competing versions of the
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retained its primacy throughout the bulk of the bill's legislative history.
Indeed, the purchasing power theory remained the emphasized constitu-
tional basis of the bill when it passed the Senate by a vote of 63-12 on
May 16.205
On May 27, 1935, however, the Supreme Court handed down its
Schechter decision. Senator Wagner, fearing that the opinion cast some
doubt on the constitutionality of his bill, managed "to have the bill re-
committed to the House Labor Committee for the purpose of redrafting
the Declaration of Policy and the definitions of commerce."'  Wagner
lieutenants Leon Keyserling, Calvert Magruder, and Philip Levy revised
the Declaration of Policy "to emphasize the effect of labor disputes on
interstate commerce and to de-emphasize the mere economic effects
which had been rejected by the court."2 7 Indeed, as reported back on
June 10, 1935, the bill now gave the current of commerce theory primacy
over the purchasing power theory. The Declaration of Policy was re-
placed by a "Findings and Policy," which now began:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which
have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing in-
terstate and foreign commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or
operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the
current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or control-
ling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods
from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials
or goods in commerce.
208
There followed a statement of the purchasing power theory, which was in
turn followed by the argument that protection of the right of collective
bargaining "safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interrup-
tion, and promotes the flow of interstate and foreign commerce by re-
moving certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest.' °9
The amended bill also contained a revised definition of "affecting com-
merce." Though it retained "affecting commerce" as the defined term,
Congress no longer made any pretense to jurisdiction over practices that
merely "affected" commerce. Instead, the term was now defined to mean
"in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
bill. See H.R. Rep. No. 7937, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legisla-
tive History, supra note 203, at 2845; H.R. Rep. No. 7978, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935),
reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History, supra note 203, at 2857.
205. See 79 Cong. Rec. 7681 (1935).
206. The Wagner Act Cases, supra note 4, at 82. See The Jones & Laughlin Case,
supra note 4, at 59; James A. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board
144 (1974).
207. Gross, supra note 206, at 144 (quoting from the author's oral history interview
with Philip Levy).
208. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legisla-
tive History, supra note 203, at 3032-33.
209. Id. at 3034.
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commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening
or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
210
Defending the amended bill on the floor of the House, Representative
Charles Truax of Ohio drew again upon the most powerful constitutional
metaphor in the arsenal of federal regulatory power:
Whenever the normal flow of the river is obstructed and impeded by
water-logged trees and stumps or refuse, the only effective remedy is to
either shove, pry out, or blast out these impediments and so put the
same logic and process of reasoning when the natural flow of manufac-
tured goods or raw materials which are the products of wage-workers,
of men who earn their bread by the sweat of their brows, is impeded,
restrained, and obstructed by reactionary, selfish, greedy water-logged
employers, then it is high time that Congress should enact legislation
to remove once and for all time the causes of the impediments to
human progress and welfare. 211
Truax's colleagues concurred, and on June 19th the same House that was
to express such grave constitutional misgivings about the Guffey Coal
Act passed the Wagner Act by a voice vote.212 The Senate conferees
readily acceded to the House's amendments, 213 and the Senate agreed to
the conference report without debate.2" 4 Signing the bill on July 5th,
President Roosevelt emphasized the comparatively modest ambitions of
the legislation. The Wagner Act, he declared, "must not be misinter-
preted. It may eventually eliminate one major cause of labor disputes,
but it will not stop all labor disputes. It does not cover all industry and
labor, but is applicable only when violation of the legal right of independ-
ent self-organization would burden or obstruct interstate commerce. ' 215
The Schechter decision had intervened in time to give the Act's fram-
ers guidance concerning the commerce power theory most likely to sus-
tain the Act through judicial review. The timing of the decision had also
afforded the sponsors of the Act an opportunity to shore up its constitu-
tional foundation. As Richard Cortner has noted, the Act's proponents
now "were essentially betting on the viability of the 'flow of commerce'
cases." 21 6 It was now up to the lawyers of the NLRB to find test cases
for which the current of commerce doctrine could serve as a vessel.
210. Id. at 3035.
211. Id. at 3187.
212. See 79 Cong. Rec. 9731 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History, supra
note 203, at 3227.
213. See H.R. Rep. No. 1371, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Leg-
islative History, supra note 203, at 3252.
214. See 79 Cong. Rec. 10,259 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History, supra
note 203, at 3260.
215. 79 Cong. Rec. 10,720 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, Legislative History, supra
note 203, at 3269.
216. The Wagner Act Cases, supra note 4, at 185.
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B. Selecting the Test Cases
Before the Wagner Act had even been signed, the NLRB lawyers were
preparing a strategy for selecting promising cases through which the con-
stitutionality of the Act might be sustained. The "master plan," set forth
in a memorandum entitled "Selection of Test Cases Under the National
Labor Relations Act," was crafted in the early summer of 1935 and
adopted by Charles Fahy when he became general counsel in August of
that year.217 Anxious to avoid the fumbling that had characterized the
defense of the NIRA, and temperamentally unlike the litigation-averse
lawyers of the AAA, the NLRB lawyers "were eager to press for court
enforcement of the Wagner Act and determined to outline a step-by-step
strategy leading from case selection to the Supreme Court."2" 8
The NLRB lawyers recognized from the start that the most common
and legally challenging type of case they would encounter would involve
the application of the Act to enterprises engaged in manufacturing or
processing. Here, the NLRB would have to face the line of Supreme
Court precedent holding that manufacturing and commerce were dis-
tinct. They also recognized that the line of precedent under which the
Act was most likely to be sustained in such cases was that which author-
ized Congress to remove obstructions from the stream of commerce.
"The first job of the NLRB, then, would be to develop cases in which
obstruction, particularly to the flow of goods from one state to another,
could be demonstrated conclusively." '219 The NLRB lawyers were in-
structed in this regard to keep an eye out for enterprises in which "a
substantial part of the raw materials flow from other states into the man-
ufacturing plant and a substantial part of the resulting products flow out
from the plant to other states."'"
As Peter Irons has noted, the NLRB's litigation strategy was "a logi-
cal outgrowth of the structure of the Wagner Act and a perceptive analy-
sis of the... conflicting lines of precedent."'" NLRB general counsel
Charles Fahy certainly agreed. In a 1963 conversation with Charles Leo-
nard, Fahy contended that "the Wagner Act should have been sustained
on the basis of precedents .... and I am not inclined to attribute the fact
that it was sustained to anything but that it was believed to be constitu-
tional."222 No doubt reflecting on the fact that Van Devanter and Butler
had joined in the Taft Court's current of commerce opinions, Fahy re-
marked, "[iun fact, I thought it might be sustained by a vote other than
217. See Irons, supra note 142, at 240-41.
218. Iad
219. Id at 241.
220. Id at 242 (quoting Memorandum, Selection of Test Cases Under the National
Labor Relations Act, July 9, 1935, by Tom Emerson, Gerhard Van Arkle, Charles Wood,
and Garnet Patterson).
221. Id at 243.
222. Charles A. Leonard, A Search for a Judicial Philosophy: Mr. Justice Roberts and




The NLRB master strategy also called for the identification of test
cases involving the manufacture of goods that were vital to the nation's
economy. Autos, steel, textiles, and clothing were all singled out for par-
ticular attention. Throughout 1935 and 1936, the NLRB lawyers win-
nowed and selected promising test cases, carefully guiding them through
the trial and appellate courts. By late 1936, they had three promising
test cases before the Supreme Court. The Jones & Laughlin Company
manufactured steel at its plant in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania;224 the Fried-
man-Harry Marks Clothing Company manufactured men's clothing in
Richmond, Virginia;225 and the Fruehauf Trailer Company built trailers
in the Motor City.2 2 6 Each plant received the bulk of its raw materials
from out of state, and each plant shipped the bulk of its products to
states other than the one in which it was located. In each case the com-
pany had been found guilty of an unfair labor practice under the provi-
sions of the National Labor Relations Act.2 27
C. Briefing and Arguing the Cases
The briefs in these three cases dutifully carried out the directives of the
master memorandum. The Government relied principally on Stafford
and Olsen. In each case, the plant in question was located in a current of
interstate commerce, and in each, the Government contended that labor
disturbances at the plants threatened to obstruct the free flow of inter-
state commerce. Since location in a current of commerce transformed
the local into the national, "the fact that the injury actually arises from
local activities is of no moment. ' 228 The purpose of the Act, the Govern-
ment emphasized, was "to prevent the direct physical obstruction to the
stream of commerce caused by industrial strife. 229
The two principal challenges faced by the Government attorneys were
that of breaching the production/commerce distinction and that of dis-
tinguishing Carter Coal. For the former task the Government relied
heavily on Stafford. Citing Taft's portrait of a current of commerce flow-
ing through "slaughtering centers," the Government contended that
"[t]he Court thus recognized that stoppage for purposes of processing in
the packing plant, involving a definite interruption in the physical move-
ment and a very distinct transformation in the nature of the commodity,
223. Id. Indeed, Fahy was utterly confident that Hughes and Roberts would vote to
sustain the Act, and "encouraged his staff to prepare their arguments on the assumption
that an unfavorable decision in Carter would not invalidate the Wagner Act." Irons,
supra note 142, at 252-53.
224. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
225. See NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937).
226. See NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937).
227. See Emerson, supra note 142, at 71-89.
228. Brief for Petitioner at 77, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937) (No. 419).
229. Id. at 66.
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did not cause a break in the 'stream' or 'current' of commerce in the
constitutional sense.",230 "Moreover," continued the Government's brief,
operations in the meat packing plants are as essentially manufacturing
as are the operations at Aliquippa. It is common knowledge that meat
packing involves a very extensive transformation in the nature of the
commodity; this is fully brought out in the authorities upon which the
Court relied in the Stafford case. There, as here, the essential purpose
of the processing operation is not merely to facilitate the flow of com-
merce, but also to halt it and to transform the commodities in question
into things considerably different, by manufacturing or processing op-
erations of varying degrees of complexity. Indeed, due to the seasonal
character of the supply of raw materials and the stable demand for
meat products, with a consequent necessity for much storage, and to
the necessary slowness of many of the operations in the meat-packing
industry, such as chilling, curing and smoking, the delays or stoppages
of the flow of products in that industry are frequently much longer
than those in the operations of respondent.
231
The current of commerce doctrine was also the principal means by
which the Wagner Act cases were to be distinguished from Carter Coal:
[T]he National Labor Relations Act as here applied is concerned with
activities which occur under circumstances closely related to a flow of
commerce, and which directly affect that flow. In the Schechter case
the flow of goods had ceased; in the Carter case the flow had not yet
begun. In both cases the Court was careful to restrict its decision to
that state of facts, and to distinguish the facts of cases such as Stafford
v. Wallace and the case at bar. 3 2
Industrial strife in the cases at bar did "not, in the words of the Carter
case, operate 'mediately, remotely or collaterally;' rather, it actually
stops the movement of goods. 233
The Government's oral arguments echoed the themes sounded in its
briefs. In each case the Government attorneys described in elaborate de-
tail the in-flow of raw materials and the out-flow of semi-finished and
finished products from the manufacturing plants. Again, citing Taft's
Stafford dictum, Warren Madden contended that the Court had there
found meat packing plants to be part of a current of interstate commerce.
"[T]he analogy which we draw of the flow of raw materials into and
through and the flow of finished products out of the steel mills," he con-
tended, "seems to be a logical one. '234
Throughout the course of their arguments, the Government attorneys
were at pains to distinguish Carter Coal. Indeed, immediately after Mad-
den's invocation of the Stafford dictum, Justice Sutherland sought to lead
230. Id at 67.
231. Id at 67-69.
232. Id at 90-91.
233. Id at 78.
234. Arguments in Cases Arising Under Labor Acts Before the Supreme Court, S.
Doe. No. 52, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 116 (1937) [hereinafter Arguments].
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
him into the mistake of claiming for Congress the authority to regulate
productive activities transpiring at the terminals of the current of
commerce.
Justice SUTHERLAND: So far as the cattle are concerned, how far
could you go? You say that that is an analogous situation?
Mr. MADDEN: That is right.
Justice SUTHERLAND: Taking it back, for instance, to the herder;
suppose the herders raising cattle organized a union. Could Congress
regulate that?
Mr. MADDEN: I should say not, Your Honor.... We no more assert
that manufacturing is interstate commerce than did this Court in Staf-
ford v. Wallace assert that meat packing or soap making or feeding hay
to cows is interstate commerce. We merely assert that the Govern-
ment, which has the responsibility, cannot have the factory gates
slammed in its face and have it said to it, "Inside here you have lost
your control, and whatever happens to your great stream of commerce
is none of the National Government's business., 235
Madden's parry of Sutherland's thrust was representative of the Govern-
ment's strategy in arguing the Wagner Act cases. As Richard Cortner
has noted, "the government was not seeking a full retreat from the di-
rect-indirect effects formula and the doctrine of dual federalism, but
rather a shifting of emphasis by the Court from those principles to the
principles embodied in the stream of commerce cases. "236
In his peroration, Labor Department Solicitor Charles Wyzanski al-
luded, in connection with the Fruehauf case, to the CIO sitdown strikes
taking place in the automobile industry:
[T]here is a national public interest in this subject ... and I contend
that where two colossal forces are standing astride the stream of com-
merce threatening to disrupt it, it cannot be that this Government is
without power to provide for the orderly procedure by which the dis-
pute may be adjusted without interruption to the stream of
commerce.
237
Wyzanski's invocation of Holmes' formula was the last thing the Justices
heard before retiring to their chambers to consider their decision.
D. The Opinions
The craftsmanlike labors of the NLRB lawyers had presented Hughes
and his colleagues with a well-established doctrinal theory upon which
the Wagner Act might be sustained. In each of the three test cases, raw
materials flowed into the enterprise from outside the state and, after a
transformation in form, were shipped on to purchasers outside the state
of manufacture. Chief Justice Taft had made clear in Stafford that the
fact that the enterprise in question was engaged in production was not
235. Id. at 116-17.
236. The Jones & Laughlin Case, supra note 4, at 148-49.
237. Arguments, supra note 234, at 173-74.
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dispositive; and, as a general proposition, this point was amply supported
by numerous cases not involving the current of commerce theory."
Schechter and Carter Coal could both easily be distinguished on the
grounds that the enterprises in question there had been located at one of
the terminals of, rather than in, a current of interstate commerce. In-
deed, the Court in each of those two cases had explicitly rejected current
of commerce arguments for precisely that reason.
No departure from existing commerce doctrine was necessary in order
to sustain the Act. Indeed, the current of commerce doctrine would have
appeared to require that the Act be upheld. Had Hughes and his col-
leagues wished simply to uphold the Wagner Act, whether out of fear of
the Court-packing plan or in response to the 1936 election, yet at the
same time wished to maintain the appearance of a strict doctrinal consis-
tency so as to avoid charges of trimming principles for political conven-
ience, they could easily have done so by simply accepting the current of
commerce theory offered up by the Government. Had they done so, a
great deal of historical confusion about the New Deal Court might have
been averted.
Rather than taking the safe, convenient route marked by the Govern-
ment attorneys, Hughes and his colleagues from the Nebbia majority
again indulged themselves in an eminently Langdellian enterprise. Like
Williston and his colleagues at the American Law Institute, Hughes used
the opportunity occasioned by the Wagner Act cases to set forth a grand
restatement of the law. Of the same age and intellectual generation as
Williston (born 1861), Hughes (born 1862) in Jones & Laughlin applied
the Restatement method to Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Drawing
together all of the various exceptions to the local/national distinction
that had accrued over the past three decades, Hughes sought to reformu-
late them into a single, synthetic principle. The current of commerce
cases were "particular, and not exclusive, illustrations" of the instances
in which the federal government might, under the aegis of the commerce
power, regulate activities that were, when considered separately, purely
local in nature. Several cases had authorized congressional regulation of
the intrastate rates of common carriers in order to prevent unjust dis-
crimination against interstate commerce.3 The Safety Appliance Act
and the Hours of Service Act had similarly been upheld as applied to
instrumentalities and persons working solely in intrastate transporta-
tion.2" Antitrust prosecutions against combinations of employers en-
gaged in productive industry had been sustained in Standard Oil Co. v.
238. See cases discussed infra notes 241-43.
239. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1937) (citing
Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914); Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194,
210-11 (1931); Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588
(1922)).
240. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 38 (citing Baltimore & Ohio IR. Co. v. ICC,
221 U.S. 612 (1911); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)).
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United States24' and United States v. American Tobacco Co. 24 2 Similarly,
the Sherman Act had been consistently and successfully applied to the
conduct of employees engaged in production where it had been shown
that such conduct was intended to restrain or control the supply of a
product entering and moving in interstate commerce.243
From among these disparate exceptions to the local/national distinc-
tion of dual federalism, Hughes concluded, one could deduce a single
synthetic principle of general application. "Although activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered," wrote Hughes, "if
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to
exercise that control." 244
Hughes was undoubtedly aware that the principle he was articulating
was rather amorphous, and he hastened to assure that the Court did not
intend to tamper with the contours of dual federalism:
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of
our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to em-
brace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually oblit-
erate the distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government. The question is necessar-
ily one of degree.245
As this passage illustrates, the distinction between direct and indirect
burdens on commerce was not obsolete-it was simply no longer for-
mal.246 As it had in Nebbia, the Court declined to decide an issue of
constitutional law by recourse to a formalist metaphysic. "We are asked
to shut our eyes," Hughes exclaimed,
to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the question of
direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum.... We have often
said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is
equally true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised
by a judgment that does not ignore actual experience. 247
Interestingly, this deformalization of the direct/indirect distinction,
241. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
242. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
243. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 39-40 (citing Local 167 v. United States, 291
U.S. 293, [2]97 (1934); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n., 274 U.S. 37(1927), superseded by statute, Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115, as
stated in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457
U.S. 702 (1982); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925)).
244. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
245. Id. (citation omitted).
246. Indeed, one finds Justice Roberts employing the notion of direct and indirect bur-
dens on commerce in a majority opinion as late as 1939. See Milk Control Board v.
Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
247. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41-42.
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which mirrored Nebbia's deformalization of the public/private distinc-
tion, occurred in cases that the Government had argued on a current of
commerce theory-the doctrine within which the two distinctions had
become conflated. The logical consequences that Nebbia's deformaliza-
tion held for Commerce Clause doctrine were thus realized in the first
current of commerce case the Court saw in the post-Nebbia era.
The language Hughes used to adumbrate his formulation was clearly
influenced by Cardozo. Cardozo had, in his Schechter concurrence,
stated that the law was not indifferent to considerations of degree, but
that "[t]o find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost every-
where." 2' "There is a view of causation," Cardozo had written, "that
would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local in the activities of commerce.... Activities local in their immedi-
acy do not become interstate and national because of distant
repercussions."'249
Unfortunately, there is virtually no record of the fascinating in-
tracurial conversation that must have taken place on this issue. How-
ever, it does not seem at all improbable that Cardozo had convinced
Hughes and Roberts of several things. First, in light of the extent to
which the economy had become integrated since the days of their youth,
the categories of direct and indirect, which they had inherited from the
nineteenth century Court, were no longer satisfactory ways of describing
the manner in which certain activities affected interstate commerce. Sec-
ond, in light of the dissatisfaction they had expressed in Nebbia with
rigidly formalistic ways of interpreting the Due Process Clause, it was
incongruous to cling to such a formalistic way of construing the Com-
merce Clause. Third, in light of the numerous cases carving out excep-
tions to the local/national distinction, many of which Hughes had either
written or joined, formalistic doctrinal expressions of that distinction no
longer accurately stated the nation's constitutional law. Finally, as the
ultimate expositors of constitutional principles, it was incumbent upon
the Justices to distill from the various fragments of existing Commerce
Clause doctrine a single, unifying principle.
This is precisely what had happened during the drafting of the Re-
statement of Contracts in the 1920s. Samuel Williston (bom in 1861)
and Arthur Corbin (born in 1874) had been engaged in a fundamental
dispute over what should be the Restatement's definition of considera-
tion. Williston was a devotee of the very strict, classical definition of con-
sideration set forth in section 75. Corbin, a great admirer of the contract
opinions written by Cardozo (born in 1870) while on the New York
Court of Appeals, argued for the broader, detrimental reliance definition
set forth in section 90. Initially, Williston and his followers won out.
However, at the ensuing meeting of the Restatement group, Corbin





presented a plethora of cases in which the courts had imposed contrac-
tual liability in the absence of consideration as defined by section 75.
"Gentlemen," he reportedly said to them, "you are engaged in restating
the common law of contracts... what do you intend to do about these
cases?" 250 The Restaters found Corbin's arguments unanswerable and,
as a result, section 90 was included in the Restatement of Contracts.25 1
For Hughes and Roberts, the beauty of adopting Cardozo's formula-
tion was that it did not commit them to results different from those they
had voted for in Schechter and Carter Coal. Cardozo had concurred in
Schechter; and while he had dissented in Carter Coal, he had not con-
tended that the provisions of the Guffey Coal Act regulating working
conditions were constitutional-rather, he had written that the question
of the constitutionality of those provisions was not yet ripe. Cardozo's
formulation thus permitted Hughes and Roberts to accede to the intellec-
tual merits of their fellow Justice's arguments without feeling the twinge
of intellectual hypocrisy.
Yet Hughes and Roberts must have recognized that this subtlety
would be lost on most, and surely knew that the midst of the Court-
packing crisis would be considered a suspicious time during which to
restate Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Indeed, they must have been
sorely tempted to accept the doctrinally consistent alternative so pains-
takingly prepared for them by the NLRB lawyers. Rather than choosing
to travel either the comfortable path paved by the current of commerce
doctrine or the formidable restatement path, the Justices chose a middle
course. The Government had prepared for the Court a rationale with an
impeccable pedigree; and while the majority declined specifically to rest
its decision on that rationale, the opinion made clear that, had it wished
to do so, the Court could easily have reached the same result with the
current of commerce theory. The availability of the current of commerce
theory as a doctrinal backstop served to distinguish the Wagner Act
cases from Schechter and Carter Coal. Furthermore, it also served to
assure both the Justices and their audience that the Court was not trim-
ming its principles to achieve the politically expedient result. The availa-
bility of the current of commerce rationale gave the Court the liberty to
concede the persuasiveness of Cardozo's position.
Accordingly, Hughes structured his opinions so that the availability of
the current of commerce theory was apparent to anyone who read the
decisions. In describing Jones & Laughlin's enterprise, Hughes empha-
sized the far-flung nature of its holdings, the integrated, interstate nature
of its operations, 25 2 and the importance of the business in which the cor-
250. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 63 (1974).
251. See id. at 55-85.
252. The corporation, Hughes wrote, was
the fourth largest producer of steel in the United States. With its subsidiaries-
nineteen in number-it is a completely integrated enterprise, owning and oper-
ating ore, coal and limestone properties, lake and river transportation facilities
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poration was engaged.253 By selecting these features of the enterprise for
emphasis, Hughes described Jones & Laughlin's Aliquippa plant in terms
that could easily be characterized as those of a business affected with a
public interest located in a current of interstate commerce. Raw materi-
als came to Aliquippa from points outside Pennsylvania; at Aliquippa
those materials were transformed into steel; the steel was then shipped to
purchasers at various locations around the country.' The Labor Board,
Hughes noted, had characterized the company's plants at Pittsburgh and
Aliquippa as
the heart of a self-contained, highly integrated body. They draw in the
raw materials from Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia [and] Penn-
sylvania in part through arteries and by means controlled by the re-
spondent; they transform the materials and then pump them out
through the vast mechanism which the respondent has elaborated. 55
The objective and effect of the corporation's far-flung activities were the
movement of ore from the Great Lakes in raw form to points around the
country in finished form. The Aliquippa plant stood in the very gateway
of that integrated, interstate movement.
Hughes' opinions in the two companion cases to Jones & Laughlin,
NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co.256 and NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co.,25 7 also made clear the availability of the current of com-
merce rationale. In each case raw or semi-finished materials were im-
ported from out of state and were, after manufacture, exported to other
states in semi-finished or finished form. In each case, labor strife
threatened a significant disruption of this interstate flow.
In culling the facts from the Labor Board's findings, Hughes carefully
and terminal railroads located at its manufacturing plants. It owns or controls
mines in Michigan and Minnesota. It operates four ore steamships on the Great
Lakes, used in the transportation of ore to its factories.... It owns limestone
properties in various places in Pennsylvania and West Virginia... Much of its
product is shipped to its warehouses in Chicago, Detroit, Cincinnati and Mem-
phis ... In Long Island City, New York, and in New Orleans it operates struc-
tural steel fabricating shops in connection with the warehousing of semi-finished
materials sent from its works.... It has sales offices in twenty cities in the
United States and a wholly-owned subsidiary which is devoted exclusively to
distributing its product in Canada. Approximately 75 per cent. of its product is
shipped out of Pennsylvania.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1937).
253. To carry on the activities of the entire steel industry, 33,000 men mine ore,
44,000 men mine coal, 4,000 men quarry limestone, 16,000 men manufacture
coke, 343,000 men manufacture steel, and 83,000 men transport its product.
Respondent has about 10,000 employees in its Aliquippa plant, which is located
in a community of about 30,000 persons.
Id at 27. In a decade of chronic unemployment, there could be little doubt that the steel
industry was affected with a national public interest.
254. Id at 26.
255. Id at 27.
256. 301 U.S. 49 (1937).
257. 301 U.S. 58 (1937).
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placed Fruehauf's Detroit trailer manufacturing plant in a current of in-
terstate commerce:
Respondent maintains 31 branch sales offices in 12 different States and
has distributors and dealers in the principal cities of the country. A
wholly-owned subsidiary operates in Toronto, Canada, where sales are
made and considerable assembly work is done with materials obtained
from the Detroit plant and in Canada. More than 50 per cent in value
of the materials used by the respondent in manufacture, assembly and
shipping during the year 1934 were transported to its Detroit plant
from Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and other States. Most of the lumber was
transported from Southern States and most of the finished parts were
transported from States other than Michigan.... More than 80 per
cent of its sales are of products shipped outside the State of Michigan
through and to other States and foreign countries.258
Noting the importance of Fruehauf in the trailer industry and the indis-
pensable nature of its manufacturing plant, Hughes observed:
In 1934, respondent's sales amounted to $3,318,000. Its nearest com-
petitor sold only 37 per cent of that amount .... The manufacturing
and assembly operations at the Detroit plant are essentially connected
with and dependent upon the purchase, sales and distribution opera-
tions without the State of Michigan.259
Hughes similarly culled facts from the Labor Board's findings placing
Marks' clothing manufacturing plant in a current of interstate
commerce:
Respondent, a Virginia corporation, has its plant at Richmond, where
it is engaged in the purchase of raw materials and the manufacture,
sale and distribution of men's clothing. The principal materials are
woolen and worsted goods. 99.57 per cent of these goods come from
States other than Virginia, 75 per cent being purchased in New York
and fabricated for the most part in other States. Cotton linings come
from several southern States .... Of the garments manufactured by
respondent, 82.8 per cent are purchased by customers outside the
State.2 °
Concerning the men's clothing industry generally, Hughes noted the fol-
lowing findings of the Board:
"The men's clothing industry is thus an industry which is nearly en-
tirely dependent in its operations upon purchases and sales in interstate
commerce and upon interstate transportation. There is a constant flow
of raw wool from the western States and foreign countries to the mills
of New England where it is transformed into men's wear fabrics, then
to the sponging and shrinking plants of New York and Philadelphia,
then, joined by the other necessary raw materials, to the fabricating
factories of the Middle Atlantic States for manufacture into
258. NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 53 (1937).
259. Id. at 53-54.
260. NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 72 (1937).
[Vol. 61
CURRENT OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE
clothing.
' 2 6 1
Hughes also noted the significance of the clothing industry in Ameri-
can life, citing the Board's finding that "[t]he men's clothing industry is
among the twenty most important manufacturing industries in this coun-
try. 26 2 With respect to the importance of labor relations within that
important industry, Hughes observed:
"The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America is a labor organiza-
tion composed of over 125,000 men and women employed in the men's
and boys' clothing industry.... The periods before the recognition by
the employers of the Amalgamated was marked by long and bitter
strikes. In 1921 there had been a general strike in New York City
which had lasted for eight months and caused losses of millions of
dollars to employers and employees. A similar general strike in New
York in 1924 lasted for six weeks and involved all of the 500 firms in
that area and their 35,000 workers. The wage loss to the workers was
nearly $6,000,000, the financial loss to the manufacturers ran into the
millions.... Today the Amalgamated has collective agreements with
clothing manufacturers and contractors employing the greater number
of the clothing workers in the United States.
263
In both Fruehauf and Marks, the Court simply set forth the facts and,
in the final paragraph of the opinion, upheld the application of the Wag-
ner Act to the enterprise in question, "[flor the reasons set forth in our
opinion in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp."2  The Court neither elaborated doctrine nor applied, in any de-
tailed fashion, doctrine to facts. The facts set forth in the opinions were
the facts deemed by the Court to be relevant, under Jones & Laughlin, to
a determination of the validity of the Act's application to the respective
enterprises.
Thus, in each of these three companion cases, the Court carefully lo-
cated the enterprise in a current of interstate commerce, and then pro-
ceeded to characterize the enterprise, or the industry of which it was a
part, in the broad language of a business affected with a public interest
innovated by Nebbia. Like Lord Hale's port warehouses and Munn's
grain elevator, each of the enterprises in the Wagner Act cases stood
astride a current of commerce and was capable of halting its flow. If a
business activity could be located in a current of interstate commerce,
and the enterprise itself or the industry of which it was a part could be
characterized as affected with a public interest (as almost any industry
could in the wake of Nebbia), the fact that the enterprise was one of
production did not preclude federal regulation. It was not necessary to
261. Id at 73 (quoting Order of the National Labor Relations Board (Mar. 28, 1936)).
262. Id at 72.
263. Id at 73-74 (quoting Order of the National Labor Relations Board (Mar. 28,
1936)).
264. Id at 75. See NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 (1937).
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overrule Carter Coal in order to embrace this proposition, and the Court
did not do what was not required.
Justice Roberts himself, writing years later, suggested that the current
of commerce metaphor had in fact formed part of the basis of the Court's
decision. Describing the theory on which the Wagner Act had been
framed and upheld, the retired Justice wrote:
That act premises its provisions upon the proposition that industrial
conflicts interfere with and limit interstate transportation and com-
merce. Albeit a strike is localized in a given community, the flow of
goods to and from that community is interfered with. The interference
may be so great as to be a matter of national concern... even though
the situations with which the statute deals are in their essence purely
local.265
Moreover, there were several contemporary commentators who doubted
that the Wagner Act cases stood for anything broader than the proposi-
tion that the labor relations of a productive enterprise that stood astride a
current of interstate commerce could be regulated in the national public
interest.266
The Four Horsemen, defenders of the formalist faith, of course could
not accept Hughes' restatement. Moreover, because they viewed the en-
terprises in question as purely private businesses not affected with a pub-
lic interest, they could not concede the applicability of the current of
commerce theory. 267 However, their dissents should not be taken as a
paroxysm of crude anti-labor sentiment. In the companion case of Wash-
ington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. V NLRB,268 the Horsemen
joined in the Court's unanimous opinion upholding the application of the
Wagner Act to an interstate common carrier. Just two weeks earlier, in
265. Owen J. Roberts, American Constitutional Government: Blueprint and the Struc-
ture, 29 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1949).
266. See, e.g., Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1936-193 7, 32 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 278, 283-84 (1938) ("It is important to note, however, that in none [of these cases]
does the court generalize beyond the facts of the case. There is no broad holding that all
labor relations in industries producing goods for the interstate market are to be regarded
as directly connected with interstate commerce."); D.J. Farage, That Which "Directly"
Affects Interstate Commerce, 42 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1937) (suggesting that the finding of
a direct effect on interstate commerce in the Wagner Act cases may have been "predi-
cated on the fact that both the raw materials as well as the finished product moved in
interstate commerce"); F.D.G. Ribble, The Constitutional Doctrines of Chief Justice
Hughes, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1207 (1941) ("A return to the opinion rendered by
Hughes in the Jones and Laughlin case will demonstrate existing deference to the idea
that the commerce power must be related to humanly directed movement from state to
state."); Burton A. Finberg, Note, 17 B.U. L. Rev. 710, 721 (1937) ("The crux of the
majority opinion is that Congress may protect the 'stream of commerce,' and that where
a concern engaged in the business of manufacture buys its raw materials outside the state,
converts it into a manufactured product, and ships that product to points outside the
state-that concern is within the 'stream of commerce.' ").
267. See NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 97-99, 103
(1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
268. 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
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Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,269 the Horsemen had
joined in the Court's unanimous opinion upholding the collective bar-
gaining provisions of the amended Railway Labor Act.270 However,
these cases, unlike the Wagner Act cases in which the Horsemen dis-
sented, involved a business affected with a public interest clearly engaged
in interstate transportation.
The dissenters, who had the advantage of being present when the cases
were discussed in conference, clearly believed that the majority was, at
least in part, basing its decision on the current of commerce doctrine.
"We are told," wrote Justice McReynolds,
that Congress may protect the "stream of commerce" and that one
who buys raw materials without the state, manufactures it therein, and
ships the output to another state is in that stream. Therefore it is said
that he may be prevented from doing anything which may interfere
with its flow.... May a mill owner be prohibited from closing his
factory or discontinuing his business because so to do would stop the
flow of products to and from his plant in interstate commerce? May
employees in a factory be restrained from quitting work in a body be-
cause this will close the factory and thereby stop the flow of com-
merce?... May arson of a factory be made a federal offense whenever
this would interfere with such flow? If the ruling of the Court just
announced is adhered to these questions suggest some of the problems
certain to arise.27'
McReynolds' choice of examples for his reductio ad absurdum is re-
vealing. The arson example merely evinces a solicitude for the values of
federalism. Yet, the other two examples combine federalist concerns
with a concern for the protection of the kinds of zones of private eco-
nomic decisionmaking safeguarded by such due process doctrines as lib-
erty of contract and the business affected with a public interest.
Federalism and due process were both sentinels standing guard over a
vision of liberty. The current of commerce doctrine's use of a due pro-
cess formula to constrain a deviation from federalist orthodoxy was a
monument to the normative commonality of these two principal pillars
of laissez-faire formalism, and its most striking example of their concep-
tual interrelation. Nebbia, by renouncing its strand of due process doc-
trine, had sundered this relation. It was no accident, then, that the
dissenters in Nebbia were also the dissenters in the Wagner Act Cases.
269. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
270. Lest it be thought that these votes were sacrifices made to appease backers of the
Court-packing plan, it should be remembered that the Horsemen also voted unanimously
to uphold the collective bargaining provisions of the original Railway Labor Act in 1930.
See Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).




CONCLUSIONS AND A CODA
A close study of the Wagner Act decisions thus reveals that the cur-
rent of commerce doctrine, as implicitly modified by Nebbia v. New York,
served as the safety-valve theory that allowed the majority to synthesize
existing commerce doctrine into a general principle while at the same
time assuring themselves and the world that they were not succumbing
to political pressure. Had the current of commerce theory not existed,
the case might well have gone the other way.
Had it not been for the dramatic political events surrounding the
Court's decisions, it would have been difficult to contend that there was
anything very revolutionary in the opinions. Doctrinal synthesis had
been a dominant mode of legal reasoning and scholarship at least since
Langdell, and was warmly embraced by the contemporary Restatement
projects. Moreover, it is clear that what troubled the Court in these cases
was the physical obstruction to the interstate movement of goods that
might be created by unresolved industrial strife. The opinions clearly
illustrate the Court's continued conceptualization of interstate commerce
as the transportation of goods and people across state lines, and its un-
derstanding of the commerce power as the power to remove physical ob-
structions to that movement. Finally, the Court chose to shore up the
synthetic portion of its opinion with an established doctrinal buttress:
the current of commerce doctrine. No doubt the channel cut by the cur-
rent had never before been understood to be so wide. However, neither
the 1936 election nor the Court-packing plan were required to broaden
the channel. The expansion was implicit in the internal logic of Swift and
Nebbia.
Thus the Court, in deciding these cases, continued to operate within
dominant stylistic, conceptual and doctrinal paradigms. This was not
revolution; it was the kind of incremental evolution that Thomas Kuhn
might have described as "normal science." '272 In the late 1930s and early
1940s, however, Franklin Roosevelt would have the opportunity to re-
fashion the Court by appointing men who had come to legal maturity not
in the age of Cooley and Langdell, but rather in the era of Pound and
Llewellyn. During the tenure of these men, the obstruction-to-transpor-
tation theory of commerce undergirding cases like Jones & Laughlin
quickly gave way to a broader understanding of the federal commerce
power. This new understanding, under which federal regulatory power
became truly plenary, rendered the current of commerce doctrine
obsolete.
By the time the Court handed down its opinion in United States v.
Darby27 3 in 1941, all of the Four Horsemen had left the Court. Of the
Justices who had been on the Court in 1937, only Hughes, Roberts and
Stone remained. The case concerned a provision of the Fair Labor Stan-
272. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 10 (2d ed. 1970).
273. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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dards Act of 1938 that prohibited the employment of workers engaged in
"production for interstate commerce" at substandard wages or for exces-
sive hours.27 4 The case presented a golden opportunity for (if it did not
require) the Court to overrule Hammer v. Dagenhart.f5 Hammer,
which had struck down the nation's first federal law regulating child la-
bor,2 76 had long been a black mark on the Supreme Court's record. In-
deed, Hammer and a later case striking down a subsequent child labor
law2 77 had spawned a movement to add a Child Labor Amendment to
the Constitution, a movement that very nearly succeeded. 278 A Justice
sensitive to the public's passion for social reform and concerned about his
place in history almost certainly would have relished the opportunity to
pen the decision overturning such an odious precedent. Hughes had
taken the lead in writing such controversial commerce decisions as
Schechter and Jones & Laughlin, and one might well have expected the
Chief to take the lead in Darby.
Yet he did not. Instead, he ceded the limelight, and assigned the opin-
ion to Stone. At the Darby conference, Hughes expressed substantial res-
ervations about the power of Congress to regulate all "production for
commerce." 279 Production was not in itself commerce, Hughes argued;
and Congress had in the Act provided "no machinery for determining
whether ... in a particular case" the requisite "close and substantial
relationship" between the act of production and interstate commerce ex-
isted.280 If the regulatory power of Congress were to be extended to local
acts having only "remote relationships" to interstate commerce, Hughes
argued, "our dual system of government would be at an end.1 21 Here,
Hughes noted, the report of the Labor Committee had indicated that the
Act was intended to reach "every act no matter how trivial which has a
relationship to commerce. '28 2 When the vote on the case was taken,
seven of the Justices voted to uphold the Act; but Hughes passed.28 3 In-
deed, it appears that Hughes came near to dissenting from Stone's opin-
ion upholding the Act and interring the Tenth Amendment as an
independent limitation on federal power. "Even with the best possible
test," he wrote Stone privately, "the statute is a highly unsatisfactory
one, but as it is a border line case I should prefer not to write.",28 More-
274. Id at 109.
275. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
276. See Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
277. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (striking down the Child
Labor Tax, Act of Feb. 24, 1919, title XII, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138 (1919)).
278. See Carl B. Swisher, American Constitutional Development 729-32 (2d ed. 1954).
279. Conference Notes on No. 82, U.S. v. F.W. Darby Lumber Co. (Dec. 21, 1940) (on
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over, in place of his usually cheerful "I agree," he wrote grudgingly on
the back of the circulated draft of Stone's opinion, "I will go along with
this. 28 5
Even Hughes had retired by the time the Court placed its imprimatur
on the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 in Wickard v. Filburn. The
fascinating story of Justice Jackson's intellectual struggle with the Com-
merce Clause issues presented in Wickard must await a later day for an
adequate recounting. However, as one reads Jackson's opinion finding
that Congress had the power to regulate the amount of wheat Mr. Fil-
burn could grow for home consumption (an activity that was admittedly
"neither interstate nor commerce"), 28 6 one recognizes the conceptual dis-
tance the Court had travelled in the years since Jones & Laughlin.
Growth of wheat for home consumption, Jackson reasoned, reduced
the demand for wheat sold in interstate commerce and thereby reduced
the price at which such wheat was sold. Because Congress was empow-
ered to regulate the prices at which goods were sold in interstate com-
merce, it could regulate those activities that affected such prices. Though
Filburn's wheat-growing activities taken alone might exert little or no
effect on the price of wheat, his activities, "taken together with that of
many others similarly situated,"2 7 might exert a substantial effect. Thus
the kinds of arguments that had in Schechter been greeted with a skepti-
cal eye even by Cardozo, carried a unanimous Court only seven years
later. Indeed, Stone's comments on Jackson's November 11, 1942, draft
of the Wickard opinion testify to the intellectual distance the Court had
traversed. "I like very much," Stone wrote, "what you say about 'direct'
and 'indirect.' I had hoped for something like that when I remained si-
lent and left it to Cardozo to write the concurring opinion in the
Schechter Case. But he did not see the matter as you and I do."28
Economic effects upon commerce that, in 1935, a unanimous Court
considered too remote and indirect to subject local activities to congres-
sional regulation, were now sufficient to justify federal legislation. To
embrace this proposition, it was necessary for Jackson and his colleagues
to reject much of what Cardozo had written in Schechter and what
Hughes had written in Jones & Laughlin. Embracing Cardozo's
Schechter views in Jones & Laughlin, Hughes had stated that the scope of
congressional power
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
Lumber Co. 1-2 (Jan. 27, 1941) (on file with the Fordham Law Review and the Library of
Congress, Stone MSS, Box 66).
285. Opinion draft, United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (Feb. 3, 1941) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Stone MSS, Box 66).
286. Letter from Justice Jackson to Chief Justice Stone re: Wickard v. Filburn 1-2
(May 25, 1942) (on file with the Library of Congress, Jackson MSS, Box 125).
287. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
288. Chief Justice Stone's comments on Justice Jackson's November 11, 1942, draft
opinion of Wickard v. Filburn (on file with the Library of Congress, Jackson MSS, Box
125).
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may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is na-
tional and what is local and create a completely centralized govern-
ment. The question is necessarily one of degree.2 89
Jackson's opinion dismissed as irrelevant the question of whether the ef-
fect on commerce was direct or indirect, remote or proximate; the sole
relevant issue was whether the effect exerted was in the aggregate "sub-
stantial."2" In a memorandum to his law clerk, Jackson had privately
derided the direct/indirect distinction to which Hughes had clung as a
"legal phrase of limitation" having "almost no value in weighing eco-
nomic effects," one among many unsatisfactory "judicial shibboleths." 91
In a separate memorandum, Jackson even criticized the Darby opinion to
which Hughes had only reluctantly assented. Darby's statement that
Congress may regulate what is "appropriate" for regulation in connec-
tion with interstate commerce, Jackson wrote, had as a test "no real
value."2 92 In private correspondence, Jackson disavowed any further
role for the Court in maintaining what Hughes had called "our dual sys-
tem of government." In a letter to then-Circuit Judge Sherman Minton
explaining his Wickard opinion, Jackson wrote,
in any case where Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate com-
merce, the Court will accept that judgment. All of the efforts to set up
formulae to confine the commerce power have failed. When we admit
that it is an economic matter, we pretty nearly admit that it is not a
matter which courts may judge.2 93
Darby cited Jones & Laughlin only once in passing; 94 Wickard did not
cite it at all.295 Such short shrift leads one to wonder whether the Jus-
tices of 1941-42 regarded Jones & Laughlin as a particularly important
or revolutionary case.296 They certainly recognized that much of what
Hughes had written was in tension with their broader conceptions of fed-
eral power-Jackson clearly saw Hughes' opinion as only one among
289. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
290. Vickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
291. Memorandum for Mr. Costelloe re: Wickard v. Filburn 14-18 (July 10, 1942) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review and the Library of Congress, Jackson MSS, Box 125).
292. Memorandum for Mr. Costelloe re: Wickard v. Filburn 3 (June 19, 1942) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review and the Library of Congress, Jackson MSS, Box 125).
293. Letter from Justice Jackson to Circuit Judge Sherman Minton 1-2 (Dec. 21, 1942)
(on file with the Fordharn Law Review and the Library of Congress, Jackson MSS, Box
125).
294. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941).
295. See Wickard v. Filbura, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
296. Indeed, there is reason to doubt that Stone and Jackson believed that Jones &
Laughlin had overruled Carter Coal. In Darby, Stone stated that Carter had been "lim-
ited in principle" rather than overruled by the Wagner Act cases. 312 U.S. at 123. And
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many inadequate judicial attempts to articulate a formula that would sal-
vage the role of the Court in supervising exercises of the commerce
power. While Hughes had taken care to draw a portrait of interstate
movement of goods being physically impeded, to locate Jones & Laugh-
lin's plant in a current of interstate commerce that could be envisioned in
the mind's eye, the authors of Darby and Wickard believed that it was
simply no longer necessary to bother. The current of commerce doc-
trine, once the most promising doctrinal escape hatch from the strictures
of dual federalism, had in a very short time become little more than a
quaint artifact of a bygone era.
The trajectory of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence between
1937 and 1942 is no doubt the subject of a complex story that has yet to
be told adequately. However, there can be little doubt that, by 1942, the
Court was thinking about the federal commerce power (and the role of
the Court in policing exercises of that power) in ways that were funda-
mentally at odds with the ways the Court had treated such issues only
five years before. Indeed, Jones & Laughlin bears in many respects a far
greater resemblance to the commerce cases that preceded it than it does
to those that followed. The fact that such a rapid transformation of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence coincided with Roosevelt's bevy of new
appointments to the Court brings to mind Max Planck's remark in his
Scientific Autobiography: "[A] new scientific truth does not triumph by
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather be-
cause its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is
familiar with it." '297 It was the replacement of the Nine Old Men with
younger men who had more recently come to legal maturity that brought
forth a new paradigm for Commerce Clause jurisprudence. This-not the
plot of the conventional story of capitulation to external political pres-
sure-was the "structure" of the constitutional revolution. Ironically,
then, the proponents of the electoral theory of the revolution in Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence are correct-not because the results of the
1936 election persuaded the Nine Old Men to ratify the New Deal, but
because the Democratic victory enabled Franklin Roosevelt, through the
power of appointment, to refashion the high Court in his own image.
297. Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers 33-34 (F. Gaynor trans.,
1949). See also Kuhn, supra note 272, at 151 (citing Max Planck, Scientific Autobiogra-
phy and Other Papers 33-34).
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